Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, March 16, 1964, 12:58 p.m.

646. Following is summary of Nong Kimnyʼs farewell conversations with the Secretary, U. Alexis Johnson, and Hilsman March 14. Conversation with Secretary uncleared, FYI only, Noforn.

1. With Secretary: Kimny stated that although he leaving under instruction, real reason for departure was his forthcoming designation as Vice Dean Diplomatic Corps, position which his Embassy too understaffed to support. Secretary regretted Kimnyʼs departure noting his long service in Washington, raised question of identity real issues dividing USG and RKG and emphasized that we had had real interest in Princeʼs quadripartite proposal. Kimny said he groping for better understanding, leaving with heavy heart and that state of affairs perhaps reflection his inability make Cambodian attitudes and objectives well understood in US. Kimny noted that small countries like Cambodia with no armed forces to speak of must rely on international law and international public opinion for their defense.

He stressed that, rational or not, fear of Thailand and South Viet-Nam was very much reality after six centuries of war. Important central issue in quadripartite accords proposal was question of frontiers—essential references to pertinent treaties not included in US draft, thereby, by implication, calling Cambodiaʼs existing frontiers into question. Cambodiaʼs frontiers with Thailand firmly fixed by international agreement including 1946 agreement in Washington in which US participated (and for which RKG grateful) and Preah Viehar decision by ICJ for which Cambodia has American attorney Acheson to thank. In reply to direct question, Kimny replied that he was not sure if quadripartite accords question was still under consideration by RKG, Secretary replied that most countries live with past history including historical antagonisms, and noted that these relationships manageable. He added that neither Thailand nor South Viet-Nam had attacked Cambodia in recent years, but that for Cambodia to move toward Hanoi now without any clear reason raises problems of different order of magnitude which perhaps not as manageable as historical ones. Kimny countered by saying Cambodia had made maximum concession by calling for US to establish control posts on Cambodian soil, which, in effect, was abrogation of Cambodiaʼs sovereignty.

2. With U. Alexis Johnson: After long, warm expression of regret by Johnson at Kimnyʼs departure reflecting ten years of friendly personal association Kimny led to remark that we should not close door to any hope and that we must keep dialogue going. Kimny again stressed position of Cambodia surrounded by more powerful neighbors and “shock” at discovery that US draft contained no specific reference to frontier accords. Johnson stressed dangers to Cambodiaʼs self interest of course being followed by noting that Communists not willing tolerate diversity or divergence by nature while US willing live with plethora of different systems. Kimny reiterated often repeated line about Cambodian distaste for Communists, admitted that Cambodia would be even more uncomfortable with Communist Viet-Nam on her door-step but alleged that neighbors driving Cambodia to take present course. He admitted maintenance of Cambodiaʼs neutrality dependent on balance of forces in that Cambodia did not want US to leave region but that national leaders (i.e., Sihanouk) must live with day-to-day problems and cannot confine themselves to dreams. Kimny cited alleged Thai over-flights and SVN border violations as examples of day-by-day problems. To Johnsonʼs question of how rapprochement with the DRVN would help Cambodia, Kimny replied that he was not ready to speculate—that it might relate to the “psychological effect on certain countries” but that on balance only Sihanouk can answer.

3. With Hilsman: Hilsman said that he spoke as private citizen with only few more hours of Government service before him.² He stressed his deep fear of results of threatened RKG course, wondered how Thais and Vietnamese would react to alignment with DRVN and reiterated our interest in quadripartite proposal. Hilsman mentioned possibility that GVN might cut Mekong and/or begin policy of hot pursuit. He said in passing that analogy often drawn between Laos and Cambodia not really valid since Cambodia unlike Laos has sea coast. Hilsman wondered if Prince had considered these grave possibilities. Kimny replied that this expose seemed “terribly threatening to my country” and much in line with what has always been Cambodiaʼs fears. Hilsman stressed again that above remarks made in his capacity as private person and friend of Cambodia who had favored and worked hard in obtaining some form of recognition for Cambodiaʼs neutrality. Kimny stressed RKG shock upon receipt of US drafts which failed to contain provisions for appropriate citation of frontier treaties which he insisted was essential question in same manner he had to Secretary and Johnson. Failure to recognize treaties, Kimny said, meant “death” for Cambodia.

In response to questions on departure Kimny told Department officer that as of March 18 (day of his departure from Washington) Embassy staff in Washington reduced to one officer, Charge Wongsanith. Kimny does not expect to reach Cambodia until May.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CAMB–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Hirschfeld, cleared by Trueheart, Green, and Sullivan, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, Paris, London, Ottawa, and Bangkok.
2. Hilsman resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on March 15 and was replaced by William P. Bundy on March 16.