Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, March 11, 1964, 9:52 p.m.

632. Following is text of memorandum² setting out Departmentʼs current thinking re immediate reaction sacking Phnom Penh Embassy and USIS. Comments addressee posts requested urgently.³

Begin text:

1) Our general posture—Our posture during the next few days or until Sihanouk has clarified his intentions should contain the following elements:

a) Public and official expressions of shock and dismay.

b) Disappointment over RKG official connivance in attacks (not for attribution).

c) Request for enlightenment from RKG regarding its future policies toward United States and toward quadripartite conference.

d) Establish our own continued willingness to negotiate under proper circumstances but do not run after the Cambodians.

e) Maintain the open door but leave the initiative to the RKG to walk through.

2) Letter from Secretary—(See separate telegram).⁴

3) Liaison with UK—Maintain close contact with the UK, coordinating our actions with theirs whenever possible. Take no further initiative on quadripartite conference beyond Secretaryʼs letter.

4) Thailand and South Vietnam—Brief them on recent events and our attitude. State that we hope to hold the question of a quadripartite conference in abeyance pending further developments. Neither we nor Thailand nor South Vietnam should take any action which could be used by Sihanouk to place the onus for preventing the conference on us. Request that Thailand and South Vietnam issue no public statements at this juncture on quadripartite conference and that they play down events in Cambodia. We should not provide Sihanouk with any external event which he can use as a diversion to focus attention of Cambodian people away from what may be a considerable negative internal reaction to the attacks. In short we prefer to await further developments before becoming committed to a future course.

5) RKG compensation—We should leave the initiative to the RKG on the question of compensation for destruction of property. Go slow on clean up and repair, allowing considerable evidence of damage and debris to remain for time being as reminder. Let the word get out informally that we are uncertain of the future and are still considering the shape of our future relations with Cambodia. If RKG pursues question of compensation we should discuss it, since a refusal to accept compensation might cause the RKG to stop payment on the Vinnell road machinery (approximately $1.8 million).

6) Contingency planning—Undertake urgent exploration, coordinating with other agencies and with UK future courses of action to follow in Cambodia.

End text.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CAMB. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah and Hirschfeld, cleared in draft with Harriman and Hilsman, and approved by Trueheart. Also sent to Saigon and Bangkok and repeated to London and Paris.
2. The memorandum from Trueheart to Hilsman, March 11, is ibid.
3. The Embassy in Phnom Penh stated in telegram 929, March 13, that it “found little to add” since the suggestions represented “the only reasonable courses of action.” The Embassy saw “little scope left for useful diplomatic initiatives in our relations with Cambodia.” (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 631 to Phnom Penh, March 11, in which Rusk informed Sambath of his shock and concern over the attacks and reminded him that U.S. draft proposals for the four-power conference were not intended as a substitute for those of Cambodia. Finally Rusk asked for assurance that American lives and property could be protected in Cambodia. (Ibid.)