There is enclosed a memorandum for the Attorney General’s meeting with
President Sukarno. This
memorandum will be discussed at a meeting in the White House on January
14.2
Enclosure
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MEETING WITH SUKARNO
The President has instructed the Attorney General to meet Sukarno in Tokyo. The purpose
of the trip is two-fold. The first purpose is to make completely
clear the consequences for United States-Indonesian
relationships4 if Sukarno continues his present policies toward
Malaysia. The second is to further the over-all United States
objective of getting the Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos to
sit down together for talks looking toward an “Asian solution” of
the dispute. Depending on the progress made with Sukarno, the Attorney General
may be asked to continue on to Manila, Kuala Lumpur and London—the
latter being particularly important if Sukarno is at all
forthcoming.
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There are a number of ways in which a satisfactory solution might
come about, and it is unnecessary—perhaps even useless—to try at
this stage to be precise about how events might move toward such a
solution. However, for purposes of illustration, it might be helpful
to set down the following as one way in which a satisfactory
solution might eventuate:
- 1.
- Since it is unreasonable to expect Tunku to negotiate with a
pistol at his head, Sukarno agrees to call off all military
“confrontation” entirely. If this cannot be done he agrees
to at least a cease-fire during which talks can
begin.
- 2.
- In exchange for Sukarno’s abandoning military
“confrontation”, the Tunku agrees to talks without
pre-conditions—i.e. the Tunku drops his present condition that talks
shall constitute recognition of Malaysia.
- 3.
- The British agree to the above and also to some lessening
of their military “presence” on the Borneo border.
- 4.
- It is highly desirable that the solution coming out of the
tripartite talks be one that the participants themselves
develop. But one form that this might take but which we
should not mention to any of the participants is for the
Malaysians to guarantee to do in North Borneo exactly what
the Indonesians do in fulfillment of their UN pledge for a “plebiscite” in
West New Guinea—but only if there is no subversive or
guerrilla warfare in the intervening five years.
The Situation
Sukarno has refused to
accept the existence of Malaysia. Although he had given us assurance
he will not engage in open attack, he has mounted guerrilla action
and a political and economic campaign to destroy the state or alter
its nature. His precise objectives are unclear to us—and probably to
him as well,—but they probably are to: 1) as a maximum, detach the
Borneo states from Malaysia and establish a more sympathetic regime
in Kuala Lumpur; 2) as a minimum, implement a formula that would
allow the Borneo states to remain within Malaysia but permit
Sukarno to claim a
public victory over his opponents and give him an opening for future
attempts to assert domination over Malaysia; 3) eliminate British
influence in the area; and 4) prevent possible Chinese take-over on
Indonesia’s borders.
Whatever his actual purpose, Sukarno’s campaign of confrontation has led to an
increasingly serious threat to the peace of the region. The British:
1) have assumed responsibility for Malaysia’s defense against
Indonesia; 2) are suffering losses from Sukarno’s guerrillas; 3) are
being forced to move in more military resources than is convenient;
4) have consistently been trying to get us involved in order to
share the burden with them; and 5) are fast losing both patience and
objectivity. The Australians, also committed to defend Malaysia, are
holding back, as they do not want to come into direct conflict with
their large and close neighbor. They hope that some sort of modus
vivendi can be worked out with the Indonesians. Under growing
British pressure to commit
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troops to Borneo, however, they will find it increasingly hard to
stay out if the guerrilla attacks continue.
The implications for us are two-fold. In terms of our general
interests, the outbreak of open hostilities between Britain and
Indonesia would have a potentially disastrous effect on the security
of the area, on relations between the West and the neutralist
Afro-Asians, and on the future orientation of Indonesia. In terms of
our specific commitments, hostilities between Australian and
Indonesian forces in Borneo would enable the Australians to invoke
the ANZUS pact and call upon us
for direct intervention against Indonesia.
Purpose of the Meeting
The danger in the situation has primarily arisen from Indonesian
military guerrilla action, although mishandling, blunders,
inflexibility and cupidity on part of various of the other
parties—the British, Malaysians and Filipinos—have contributed
substantially. If the dangerous deterioration is to be reversed,
Sukarno must be
induced to take the first step. That step must be the cessation of
military activity against Malaysia. This by itself would leave the
dispute far from resolved, but it would create an atmosphere in
which further initiative could eventually bring about a tolerable
solution.
The task of inducing Sukarno to abandon military confrontation will
be difficult, since it will require him to give up not only his most
potent weapon against Malaysia but also by implication, his maximum
objectives toward it. Abandoning military confrontation will also
force him to reverse a policy to which he has publicly pledged
himself, which will be excruciatingly difficult for one with
Sukarno’s ego. There
are, however, factors already pushing him toward an easing of
tensions. Indonesia’s economy is under severe strain and worse is in
sight. The foreign aid on which Indonesia has relied for a decade is
drying up, largely because of “confrontation”, and no major
injections from either East or West are in the offing. Aside from
lukewarm Philippine support and the propaganda backing of the Bloc,
Sukarno has attracted
no outside support for his campaign and a great deal of
international censure. With a few exceptions (confiscation of
British property in Indonesia, severance of relations with the
UK), he has already committed
virtually all the weapons at his disposal without bringing down
Malaysia, and seems to be at somewhat of a loss as to his next move.
Although willing to run very high risks, he knows that the
British-Australians are far too strong for him and that he cannot
deliberately provoke an open conflict.
Our basic leverage with Sukarno is the fact that, however cavalier he is
with American sensibilities, he is demonstrably anxious to retain
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United States
friendship. He wants and needs our aid; he relishes the prestige of
dealing with us as an “equal”; and he certainly senses the manifold
disadvantages to Indonesia of a serious breach with the world’s most
powerful nation. But if given no alternative other than a
humiliating public defeat, he would probably be willing to break
with us. Our leverage thus is substantial but limited.
