267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1
126616. 1. Rostow called in Ansary March 7 and made following points:
2. In the nature of the relationship of confidence and trust between our two countries and the respect and admiration we feel for the Shah, it is gratifying and right that we clear away any doubts, misunderstandings or suspicions that may arise between us. It is natural, given the complexity of some of the problems we face together, that such misunderstandings can arise from time to time. We appreciate the spirit that led Shah to ask the Ambassador to raise with us the problems we discussed at our last meeting.
3. We have rechecked the points raised. We are glad to assure the Shah that so far as we can find out from all sources there is no substance to any of the rumors that have been given us. No one at the Embassy has been in contact with Amini, nor has any American connected with other official groups. It is true that the possibility of a social meeting with Amini was mentioned at a dinner party some time ago, but it was not followed up. From the point of view of our normal diplomatic policy, as the Ambassador knows, we would see such meetings as normal. The problem of contacts has been fully and amicably discussed by Ambassador Meyer with the Shah. If you have more concrete evidence, we should be glad to consider it. But it is hard to check on vague and general rumors.
4. Any contacts Embassy officers or other officials have had with students, through Student Center at university or otherwise, have been most casual and normal. The idea of Americans being involved in any way in student movements or demonstrations is fantastic, and has no foundation.
5. With regard to the cancellation of the Shah’s visit to King Feisal, our views were thoroughly and frankly discussed with the Shah. While we were somewhat disappointed, we understood his decision, and there was no criticism of it. We did not discuss our views in public, or outside a very tight circle in the government.
6. On broader issues, Rostow said he had been unable to detect any rebels against the President’s policy. In every agency, and at every level, there was a unanimity remarkable in the American government, and not very typical of the American mind—a unanimity of enthusiasm for what [Page 478] Iran is accomplishing, and of confidence in the Shah’s leadership, at home and abroad—in the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in world affairs.
7. On oil questions, we have indeed been neutral. The Saudis think we favor Iran. Our efforts with the Consortium have been addressed to facilitating clearer understanding and good will on both sides. The Consortium has made major concessions to Iran in past two years, and their performance over the last 15 years has been spectacular, and has helped make possible the Shah’s program of economic and social development. So far as Iraq is concerned, their behavior over the years has reduced both investment and their share in production.
8. With regard to the arms supply problem, Rostow said he had checked on the status of plans. Draft military agreement had not been sent to Embassy some time ago. Nothing more than an uncleared sketch had been received. But a directive has now been issued to have the entire matter prepared for action very quickly. Ways and means of financing the transaction are being studied. We have every reason to expect an answer within a short period. We must of course bear in mind the history of Congressional interest in arms sales generally.
9. About the Gulf, we stand ready to examine problems of cooperation and stabilization in that vital area with GOI, here and in Tehran. We realize the sensitivity and importance of the issues involved, and will do our best to facilitate their solution. The problems of the Gulf are of critical importance. The latest Soviet statement on the subject is serious. It asserts that our interest in the safety of the region is directed against the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union. It endorses national liberation movements in the area, and attacks “imperialist and neocolonialist regimes.” And it offers Soviet protection to the governments of the area in order to safeguard them against imperialist encroachments. Rostow said there was no need to stress the implications of this bold public statement, as published in Pravda on March 4.
10. Our government is unanimous in its admiration of and respect for our Ambassador. He has been doing an extraordinary job. Ansary warmly and enthusiastically agreed and said he knew Shah had great confidence in Ambassador Meyer. Rostow said we were glad to be assured by the Ambassador that Ambassador Meyer enjoys the confidence of the Shah. We believe that confidence is fully merited. Ambassador Meyer presents the Iranian viewpoint to us with great force and understanding. We are glad there is no misunderstanding between us on this point. Rumors of this kind would normally be cleared up in frank talks with the Ambassador in Tehran, and we are sure this practice will continue to be the rule when the Shah returns to his capital. Ansary agreed with Rostow that undoubtedly reason why these issues were raised in Washington rather than Tehran at this time was their sensitivity. In view of [Page 479] probable sources of reports, it would have been difficult for Shah to handle problem by cable to Tehran.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Under Secretary Rostow on March 7, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Grey.↩