Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 6, 1968, 0750Z.

3627. Eyes Only for Under Secretary Rostow. For delivery at 8:00 a.m. Wednesday.

1. Based on evaluation in Tehran 3626,² and recognizing our problem as psychological and tactical, as well as political, I offer following recommendations in treating suspicions and fears reflected in Shah’s démarches via Ansary:

2. Play it cool. If Shah thinks he has US on defensive, he is apt to become even more temperamental.

3. Apply appropriate massaging. Early indication through me via Alam that President will have Shah to lunch when he comes for Harvard degree would be very helpful. Periodic correspondence with President, as well as high-level USG visits, also indicated.

4. Do what we can to placate grievances. Make clear Embassy has not been in contact with Amini, nor encouraged striking students. Neither have we sided with Aramco; on contrary our record in Shah’s behalf quite extraordinary. Might note Saudis are alleging Iran is our favorite.

5. Both here and in Washington (and probably in consultation with British) we should address ourselves intensively to critical problems in Gulf area in wake of British departure, i.e. Median Line, Tunb and other mid-Gulf islands, and, of course, Bahrein. Purpose to facilitate solutions with which Shah can live. While these problems may seem minor on world scene they are of type which breed major confrontations if not resolved.

6. Remind Shah consortium has made remarkable number of concessions to Iran in past two years and that in short span of less than 15 years Iran has catapulted from Mosadeq’s abyss to front rank in Mideast oil production. Should also point out that while Iraq is now increasing production their demagogic tactics, e.g. unilateral legislation and taking away proven fields, have dropped them way behind in Mideast oil derby. Their performance not worthy of emulation. (Meanwhile, we should seek from Mobil some useful explanation, if there is one, to counter Iranian annoyance at Hungarian reports that Mobil has tried to under-cut NIOC.)

7. Request Henry Kuss to correct report given to Iranian Embassy, Washington, that draft military agreement was sent to Embassy “some time ago.” Fact is that what we received was an uncleared piece of paper. Meanwhile, assure Iranians along lines reported in para 1.g of Tehran 3619.³

8. Seek diversions. Shah is presently all tied up in knots re his own problem. To extent we can, we should draw his attention to world problems, e.g. Mideast and Viet Nam, and invite his thoughts. Incidentally, special Viet Nam briefing team will be coming here in few days and our hope is Shah will agree to receive them.

9. To extent possible enlist cooperation of Israelis (possibly also Turks) to disabuse Shah of suspicion that USG has turned against Iran. Separate airgram reports Israeli attitudes here.

10. Assure Shah of complete USG confidence. This means all agencies, including CAS and Embassy. Make clear there is absolutely no possibility of separate clandestine policies.

11. To extent you feel possible declare your full confidence in US Ambassador in Tehran and your disappointment that in spirit of frankness, suspicions and allegations have not been taken up directly with him. If feasible, you could point out that Ambassador in Tehran has presented Iranian case in fashion more formidable than Shah apparently appreciates and that he deserves Shah’s full trust. Note: Alam once delightfully described me as Iran’s best Ambassador to Washington and he implied Shah felt that way too.⁴

12. Here in Tehran, I intend to have heart-to-heart talks with Hoveyda and Zahedi, as well as with Shah when he returns. I confident we can lay to rest suspicions against Embassy even though Shah’s deeper concerns may be more difficult. Big challenge is to inspire Iranians to follow up their successes to date by playing leading constructive role in future of Persian Gulf area.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Document 264.
3. Document 263.
4. In telegram 125954 to Tehran, March 7, Under Secretary Rostow thanked Meyer for his suggestions and said that he had consistently expressed his confidence in the Ambassador, which was shared by all of them there, and would continue to do so in talks with Iranian officials. (Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-U.S.)