266. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, September 29,
1968.
SUBJECT
- Views of the United States Government Regarding the Communication
Presented by the Government of the USSR
PARTICIPANTS
- The Under Secretary
- His Excellency Anatoliy
Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
-
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant
Secretary, NEA
The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr. Katzenbach, at the latter’s request, at his residence on
Sunday, September 29, at approximately 8:15 p.m.
[Page 523]
Mr. Katzenbach handed to the Soviet
Ambassador the attached paper which the Under Secretary described as the
views of the United States with respect to the recent communication
presented by the Government of the USSR to
the United States.2 Mr. Katzenbach
emphasized that the paper contained the views of the United States and did
not represent the views of the Government of Israel or any other country in
the area. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out
that Ambassador Jarring has worked
long and hard and that he has a chance in the weeks ahead with the Foreign
Ministers present to make progress under the resolution of November 22,
1967. The United States expects to exercise all influence possible on the
situation and hopes to get substantive discussions underway in what will be
an important period. It is particularly important, Mr. Katzenbach emphasized, for all pressure
possible to be placed upon the countries concerned and in particular the
UAR, Jordan, and Israel. The longer
there is no move toward peace, the greater the difficulty, and the United
States hopes very much that progress will be possible during the New York
meeting.
The Soviet Ambassador asked what the main point was of the communication. Is
it merely to assist Ambassador Jarring?
The Under Secretary replied that this was the main point and that the United
States was making every effort to support him in his efforts.
The Ambassador asked what was new in the paper. The USSR considers that there must be concrete proposals if there
is to be progress.
Mr. Katzenbach replied that we
considered proposals for a solution should be advanced by Jarring in an effort to promote agreement of
the parties. One of the most difficult points would be to arrive at a
definition, for example, of agreed and secure boundaries.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that the
Soviet Union agrees that adjustments in these lines are the business of the
parties and not the business of the Soviet Union. However, he felt that it
was necessary to make concrete proposals and that the Soviet Union, while
wishing to help Jarring, considered that its more detailed suggestions had
been a move in that direction. The USSR did
not wish to press its paper. If the United States does not like the Russian
proposal, the Russians would welcome steps by the United States to offer its
own plan. France has a practical approach, and other countries must be
equally practical.
Mr. Katzenbach replied that the
question of timing was an important element. We consider it important to get
the parties down to discussion of issues and substance. We believe that we
have a common purpose with the Soviet Union of getting a settlement and
ending a
[Page 524]
dangerous situation. We
are reluctant, however, to tell Ambassador Jarring what to do. He must make that decision.
Dobrynin replied that Jordan was, he
understood, depressed and may give up. What can be done that is practical
and will help? The USSR is not trying to
impose a settlement because of the Czech situation. It, too, wished to help
Ambassador Jarring.
Mr. Katzenbach said that he had not
brought up the Czech matter, that the Ambassador had mentioned it first.
There was general talk of the problems of the area with Mr. Katzenbach emphasizing that the Arabs
primarily wanted withdrawal while the Israelis primarily want peace
arrangements based on recognition of their existence and a permanent
arrangement. The United States, of course, is aware that a peace treaty
would be difficult, but there were other forms of settlement that could
accomplish the same goal.
The Ambassador agreed to present to the Government of the USSR the views contained in the
memorandum.
Attachment
- 1.
- The United States Government has noted the views of the Soviet
Government concerning a Middle East settlement presented by
Ambassador Dobrynin to
Secretary Rusk on September 4,
1968.3
- 2.
- The United States takes the view that peace in the Middle East is
not the concern only of the countries of the region and that the
persistence of tension in that area, and the absence of peace,
threatens the general peace.
- 3.
- While sharing Soviet concern over the situation in the Middle
East, the United States cannot accept the description contained in
the Soviet document of the causes of that situation and the
positions and actions taken by the parties since the cessation of
hostilities. Moreover, it must reject as totally unfounded the
allegation that the United States Government has supported a
negative and deliberately obstructionist policy on the part of the
Government of Israel. This statement is unwarranted and untrue. On
the contrary, it is the view of the United States Government that
the level of the flow of arms from the Soviet
[Page 525]
Union into the area has been a major
factor in obstructing meaningful peace negotiations between the
parties.
- 4.
- The views of the United States have been set forth by the
President and other senior U.S. Government representatives on a
number of occasions and are well known to the Government of the
Soviet Union. The five principles enunciated by the President in his
address of June 19, 1967, as reiterated by him on September 10,
1968, remain the basis for United States policy concerning a Middle
East settlement.
- 5.
- Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution, the United
States has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador
Gunnar V. Jarring to
fulfill his mandate “to promote agreement and assist efforts to
achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the
provisions and principles” in the Council resolution. The United
States Government believes that its primary effort, along with that
of the Soviet Union and other governments, should be directed at
supporting Ambassador Jarring
and in doing nothing that would in any way detract from or interfere
in his activities. This attitude is reflected in the Security
Council’s resolution of September 18, 1968,4 to
which both the United States and the Soviet Union gave their
support.
- 6.
- The United States, on its part, will make a renewed effort to
encourage the parties to engage in the fullest and freest exchange
of substantive proposals under his auspices and to accept such
procedures as he may suggest to promote agreement as required by the
resolution. It is hoped the USSR
will do likewise. Just as we have felt that insistence upon direct
negotiations as a pre-condition to serious substantive exchanges is
unrealistic, so we believe the view that no joint talks can take
place under Jarring’s auspices
is equally unrealistic. We hope the USSR will give this critical point the serious
attention it deserves; for it is most difficult for us to conceive
that stable peace can be achieved in this area without negotiations
involving the parties at some stage, given the complexity of the
issues.
- 7.
- The Soviet document requests the views of the United States
Government concerning steps which in its view must be taken for a
prompt settlement of the Middle East problem. In response to that
request, the United States Government would like to seek certain
clarifications and present the following observations, which inter
alia could be explored in future consultations:
- (a)
- The Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the
readiness of the parties to implement the Security Council
resolution of November
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22, 1967. The United States wishes to
point out that an essential part of the obligation to
implement the resolution is the obligation to cooperate
fully with Ambassador Jarring in the carrying out of his mandate
as set forth in paragraph three of the resolution to promote
agreement among the states concerned. It does not regard the
Security Council resolution as self-implementing. It
believes, on the contrary, that under the resolution the
parties must take responsibility for an agreed settlement
and that a settlement cannot be imposed upon the parties by
others. The United States would welcome further
clarification of the Soviet views on this point.
- (b)
- The United States notes with interest that the Soviet
document refers in paragraph (a) to the possibility of
consultations “through Jarring or in some other form.” The United
States believes that consultations involving the parties
will be essential to the development of agreement on a
peaceful settlement envisaged by the November 22, 1967
Security Council resolution. Does the Soviet Union share
this view?
- (c)
- The United States agrees that it may be desirable for
United Nations forces to be employed to assist in the
carrying out of the terms of a settlement agreed by the
parties and notes in this connection that the Soviet
document makes a number of suggestions in this regard. While
not being able to accept some of the concepts reflected in
these suggestions, the United States would be prepared to
discuss with the Soviet Government the idea of use of United
Nations forces in connection with an agreed
settlement.
- (d)
- The United States further notes that paragraph (b) 5 of
the Soviet document provides that the declarations of the
Arab countries and Israel on the cessation of the state of
war and the establishment of peace would become effective
“either through the instrumentality of the Security Council
or through the signing of a multilateral document.” The
United States believes that the peace must be based upon
arrangements which directly bind the parties. Is this what
is intended by the reference to a “multilateral document”?
The United States believes that a document signed jointly by
the parties is the most desirable, if not the only, means of
obligating the parties to carry out the agreement worked out
in accordance with the resolution of November 22, 1967. It
believes, also, that Security Council endorsement of the
terms of a settlement agreed by the parties could serve a
useful purpose. The United States is not clear what a Four
Power guarantee would add to such a Security Council
endorsement of the agreement of the parties, but it is
willing to examine the possibility at the appropriate
time.
- (e)
- Concerning the above point on the cessation of the state
of war, does the USSR share
the view of the United States that a termination of the
state of belligerency would mean that there would be
complete
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freedom
of passage through international waterways, including the
Suez Canal, for all vessels?
- 8.
- The Soviet document comments at some length on the desirability of
a plan or timetable for implementation of the Security Council
resolution. The United States has no objection to the concept of a
plan under which the steps required for carrying out the peace
settlement agreed to by the parties, and the timing of those steps,
would be spelled out. It may be that the parties would find such a
detailed plan necessary since, as the Soviet document also notes,
the actions to be taken by the parties in carrying out their agreed
settlement would inevitably be interrelated and in some degree
interdependent. It is in light of this interrelationship that the
United States firmly adheres to the view that all elements of a
settlement must be dealt with in arriving at the terms of a
settlement. It is the understanding of the United States, moreover,
that the parties, including the UAR,
all recognize that the Security Council resolution requires a
“package” which would settle all the problems left open for
negotiations by the resolution, whatever the chronology for
implementation on which they might agree. In our view this position
represents a proper interpretation of the resolution.
- 9.
- There is one specific aspect of the program outlined in the Soviet
document which in particular merits comment: the idea of Israeli
withdrawal to the pre-June 5 line. The essence of the United States
policy since June 5, 1967, has been and remains that the state of
armistice among the parties must be replaced, as the resolution of
November 22, 1967, states, by a condition of peace. The armistice
agreements of 1949 called for a transition to peace and specifically
contemplated the possibility of agreed changes in the armistice
lines of 1949 as part of that transition. The Security Council
resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to secure
and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, but
does not specify that those boundaries should be precisely the lines
held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other date. In view of the
complexity of this question, the United States believes that this is
a matter which requires the priority attention of both the parties
and Ambassador Jarring.
- 10.
- The United States believes it important that the Soviet and United
States Government continue to consult on all possibilities for a
settlement of the Middle East situation. It expects to be in contact
with Ambassador Jarring in the
days immediately ahead and, of course, there will be further
opportunity for the two governments to exchange views during
Minister Gromyko’s forthcoming visit to New York during the General
Assembly session.