Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968

241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, August 19, 1968, 0915Z.

3193. 1. In Aug 17 conversation with Mohamed Riad, I waited until he had completed briefings on Jarring visit and Vinogradoff conversation (septels) before touching on some of the points in State 223116.²

2. First of all Mohamed denied that three questions discussed between UAR Embassy London and UK FonOff had any status within GUAR. Only questions GUAR had put to Israel via Jarring were those raised by FonMin Riad on Aug 17.³

3. As was to be expected, Mohamed expressed resentment at our tarring GUAR with brush of doctrinal rigidity. He said acceptance Nov 22 Res represented basic and fundamental UAR policy decision. He noted mention of “20 year state of war” in question put by Rafael to UAR through Jarring.UAR understood Israel’s concern was that UAR only interested in “removing traces of aggression” i.e. returning to pre-June 5, 1967 situation. This definitely not case. GUAR had, and would continue respond with categoric “yes” to question as to whether UAR prepared in context peace settlement put complete end to state of belligerency with Israel.

4. Mohamed said Jarring was of opinion that “agreement” called for in Nov 22 Res did not have to be agreement between parties. Jarring felt, according Mohamed, that agreement between each party and SC coupled with pledge by each party before SC would fulfill requirements of para 3 of SC res.

5. As to live-and-let-live and modus vivendi with Israel, Mohamed said GUAR prepared give binding pledge, to be guaranteed by SC, on each and every element in Nov 22 SC res.

6. I said UAR position on Suez Canal, i.e. differentiation between Israel cargoes and flag not understandable. If UAR meant what it said re readiness terminate state belligerency with Israel, then there no basis for any kind of discrimination against Israel flag. Either you had belligerency or you didn’t. It didn’t come in packages of varying size. Mohamed said agreement which UAR envisaged would culminate in total implementation of SC res. Same agreement which opened Canal to Israel cargoes “as a first step” would also spell out circumstances in which state of belligerency would be terminated and Canal opened to Israel flag.

7. I mentioned denial of Kony, Gohar, and Ghorbal of Eric Pace NY Times story of Aug 12. Mohamed said GUAR stood on FonMin-Jarring Stockholm conversation which remained its firm position. (Mohamed also said Gohar had been greatly impressed by Ball.)

8. As to proposition that UAR, Israel, and Jordan acceptance of Nov 22 Res exists subject reservations each party, Mohamed said UAR content leave this to Jarring to determine. Jarring felt he had acceptance of all three to first two paragraphs of his March-May formula.

9. When I talked about possible UAR readiness tell Jarring that it willing to try to achieve a binding agreement with Israel, Mohamed said words “with Israel” were the ones that created the problem. This recalled Washington conversations in which Dept officials had talked about Egypt’s having to “sign on the dotted line.” He reverted to proposition that UAR agreement with SC would fulfill terms of Nov 22 res. He kept saying, “Jarring not only accepts but advocates our viewpoint,” “Jarring volunteered agreement with us on this,” etc.

Bergus

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN.
2. 2 Document 239.
3. According to a briefing given to Bergus by Mohamed Riad on August 17 of a meeting held that day in Cairo between Foreign Minister Riad and Jarring, Riad had asked Jarring to convey four questions to Israel: “A) Did Israel intend to implement resolution and withdraw to June lines? B) In light of many statements of Israeli leaders re annexation of Arab territory would it continue to be Israel policy to annex territories or would Israel renounce that policy? C) What, in opinion of Israel, are secure and recognized boundaries? D) Did Israel intend to implement UNGA resolution 1947?” (Telegram 3192 from Cairo, August 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)