Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, August 4, 1964, 8:37 p.m.

64. At conclusion August 6 talks,² US officers will provide Brigadier Khammash following resume of USG statements made to him. Resume will be marked “Secret” but carry no external indication of its source.

A. General

1. Keeping in mind that there is no possibility of an increase in US budget support for Jordan, we are deeply disturbed that Jordan’s economy and prospects for economic self-reliance may be jeopardized by the threat of new defense burdens.

2. In this context, we think it is essential to consider the serious repercussions to Jordan’s economic development program should the UAC supporting contribution be insufficient to cover all military expansion and supporting costs, or should it suddenly be withdrawn or cut off.

3. The US has played a key role in enabling Jordan to develop economically and to contribute to the peace of the Near East. The stability of Jordan as well as the Near East area means a great deal to us. Jordan’s plans and what Jordan and the UAR are proposing now represents a change in strategy and a potential threat to the stability of the area. This gives us deep concern.

B. Ground Equipment

1. With respect to Jordan’s ground forces, we appreciate the pressures which are being exerted on Jordan by the UAC. To the extent that funds for the modernization, expansion, and continued support are available from other sources, we can understand why Jordan wishes to proceed with the UAC program which Khammash has outlined.

2. Recognizing the basic threats to Jordan’s sovereignty and economic development inherent in the UAC proposals, we are prepared to assist Jordan in the formulation of long-range plans for equipping and modernizing Jordan’s ground forces within its capability to operate, maintain, and support. To this end, if Jordan can obtain adequate assurance that additional money would be guaranteed by the UAC over a long period for expansion and continued supporting costs and if future Jordanian defense expenditures are held to the current budgetary level, the US is willing to consider selling military ground equipment to Jordan along the general lines of Jordan’s shopping list against payments to be received by Jordan from the Unified Arab Command in accordance with the following program:

a. We are prepared to proceed immediately to negotiate the sale of a $7 million first increment of your total ground force requirements with deliveries of equipment to follow within 12 months of a signed contract. This increment would be directed principally at modernizing or filling equipment requirements for existing forces. Subject to Jordan’s ability to secure adequate UAC funds for support and maintenance, we would also be prepared to provide in this increment for partial equipping of one National Guard unit converted to the regular force.

b. We are also prepared after negotiating sale of the first increment of $7 million to develop plans for sales against cash payments by Jordan of the additional ground equipment contained in Jordan’s total ground force requirements. To facilitate planning and deliveries of purchases financed by the UAC, the US is prepared to consider extension of credit provided that the amount of credit would not exceed $7 million at any one time.

c. The foregoing arrangements would be conditioned on Jordan holding defense expenditures at the current level of 18.6 million pounds ($51 million) and on Jordan providing through UAC contributions and/or from adjustments in its own defense budget, adequate funds for maintenance and support of new equipment and additional forces.

d. To complement the first tranche of $7 million sales, we also are prepared to continue FY 1965 military assistance at the same level as FY 1964. As you know, this includes such major items as M–48 tanks and APC’s.

e. The long-term program envisaged above should permit a gradual phased expansion of the JAA which the US would support on an incremental basis, provided UAC funds were forthcoming for materiel and maintenance support. In the event of default by the UAC in the provision of funds, this program would help minimize adverse effects on Jordan’s army and economy—particularly if the bulk of the materiel delivered initially went into Jordan’s existing forces.

C. Aircraft

We recognize that the Hawker-Hunter will become unsupportable at some point in the future and provision should be made by that time for the introduction of a replacement aircraft into the RJAF. Accordingly, we are prepared to consider the problem of replacement of the Hawker-Hunters by an appropriate aircraft. To ensure that our consideration of replacement aircraft is soundly based—militarily and economically—we propose that a study of Jordan’s air requirements, taking into account UAC recommendations, be undertaken in the near future.

D. Our Embassy is prepared to discuss the foregoing matters at further length with you and King Hussein in Amman.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Stoddart and Colonel Donald W. Bunte; cleared by Solbert, John P. Walsh, Symmes, George L. Warren of G/PM, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to London.
2. Telegram 67 to Amman, August 6, stated that Talbot presented the U.S. reply to Khammash on August 6, using talking points transmitted to Amman in telegram 66, August 5, and telegram 71, August 6. (All ibid.)