Office of the Historian

79. Information Memorandum From the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, July 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Near East Arms Policy

Attached are three memoranda submitted by NEA which advocate continuation of our present Near East arms policy. These papers consist of:

a)
A summary memorandum (Tab 1)2 which notes that our policy is under heavy pressure on three fronts: 1) US balance of payments considerations; 2) the desire of Israel and its supporters for modern US weaponry; and 3) rising Arab arms appetites generated by the formation of the United Arab Command. The particular immediate problem is the Jordanian arms request. The paper concludes that we must continue to hold the line and suggests firmness with Jordan in order to avert a major crisis in our overall relations with the Arabs and Israel. (At Tab 4 is an outgoing telegram to Amman setting forth the proposed US position.)3
b)

A contingent action memorandum (Tab 2)4 which spells out the background and objectives of our present policy and discusses in detail [Page 185] the three pressures for relaxation of our curbs on arms sales. DOD representatives have not concurred, for balance of payments and other reasons, in the NEA viewpoint. NEA considers it essential to reiterate our policy to individual US Government agencies.

The paper recommends: 1) that if necessary you seek Presidential approval for continuation of our established Near Eastern arms policy; and 2) in the absence of DOD concurrence in this recommendation, that you seek Presidential approval for his informing the Secretary of Defense of the decision to follow established Near East arms policy. However, NEA plans further consultation with McNaughton and Solbert and will inform you as to whether differences can be resolved.

c)
An information memorandum (Tab 3)5 which reviews the background of and the problems posed by the Jordanian arms request and notes that in coordination with Defense we have developed a position designed to persuade the Jordanians to concentrate on modernization rather than expansion of their forces. It points out that the decisions we must take with regard to the Jordanian request are relevant to our overall Near East arms policy, and concludes that your re-affirmation of this policy will be useful in setting forth guidelines for the entire Executive Branch.

H. Gordon6
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18 NEAR E. Secret. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Concurred in by Davies and sent through Harriman. A handwritten notation indicates that it was seen by Rusk on July 28.↩
  2. The tabs are not attached. The summary memorandum is cited in footnote 3, Document 78.↩
  3. The sentence in parentheses was added by hand. In a list of attachments at the end of the memorandum, Tab 4 is telegram 45 to Amman, July 25. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN.↩
  4. The action memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, dated July 15, on the subject “Near East Arms Policy,” is ibid., DEF 18 NEAR–E.↩
  5. Document 78.↩
  6. Herbert Gordon signed for Read above Read’s typed signature.↩