74. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- U.S.-U.A.R. Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Honorable John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the United Arab Republic
- NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs
Ambassador Badeau was received by the President at 12:45 PM for his final call prior to his resignation from government service.
The President opened the conversation by expressing warm appreciation for the Ambassador’s fine work in Cairo and regret that he was terminating his service. The Ambassador responded by expressing his own regret that unavoidable personal responsibilities had made his resignation necessary. He had found the post in Cairo challenging and stimulating, and felt that significant progress had been made in furthering American interests in the Arab world as these relate to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador particularly noted the strong support accorded him by the Department of State and the Administration and said that, in whatever progress has been made, this was a chief factor.
The President then inquired as to the current state of American-Egyptian relations. The Ambassador answered that basic relations continued to be good. Throughout his 35 months of service in Cairo, President Nasser had received him frequently, and the dialogue thus developed had proved highly useful, both in setting forth the American viewpoint and in avoiding incipient conflicts. In recent months, however, the Egyptian Government had been somewhat suspicious that the United States might be changing its policy. While no concrete evidence of such a change existed, the pressures of an election year and the fact of a new Administration made policy-making circles in Egypt unusually sensitive to American actions.
The President then asked what course American policy could most profitably take in the future in relation to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador replied with a brief summary of American relations [Page 177] with Egypt since the rise of the present Revolutionary Regime in 1952. During this time, the Ambassador pointed out, the United States had followed four distinct policies toward Egypt. The number and variety of these policies indicated something more than changing administrations in the United States, although such changes were naturally a factor in them. Basically it had been difficult for the United States to define and pursue steadily a single policy toward Egypt because there are certain mutual irritants which periodically push the two nations apart. Twice during the last 12 years Egypt and the United States had approached a major confrontation. The first occasion was in 1955, at the time of Egypt’s first arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc. The second resulted from the Suez Canal nationalization, and came to its climax in the landing of American Marines in Lebanon in 1958.
On each occasion it seemed as though both countries were prepared to throw their weight into a major confrontation. However, just as this became imminent both parties stopped, being unwilling to take the final step. In effect, they said: “We cannot do this to each other; let us pick up the pieces and try again.”
The Ambassador said that the reason for this lay in the mutual capacity to hurt each other’s interests, which both Egypt and the United States possessed. Were Egypt determined to do so it could cause considerable trouble for the United States in areas of the Near East where there are basic American interests—as witness the recent Libyan response to President Nasser’s call for the abolition of Wheelus Air Base. Equally the United States had the capacity to hurt Egypt in areas such as Yemen, Syria, and Jordan if she were determined to do so. Neither party possessed as great a capacity to hurt as it professed, but the capacity was sufficiently large to imperil certain basic national interests.
It was this fact that had prevented a major confrontation in the past. The Ambassador believed that it would continue to make a major confrontation unlikely in the future unless the U.A.R. should threaten an American interest of so basic a character that the United States would be willing to risk imperiling its position in adjacent Arab lands. This was to say that American-Egyptian relations might well continue to fluctuate between cordiality and opposition, but always avoiding the final step of major confrontation.
If this analysis was correct, the Ambassador said, it suggested that the two countries should strive to develop an on-going relation similar to that in existence between many countries. This relationship assumed a continuing bond based upon mutual interests but allowed room for direct opposition on specific issues. To illustrate this the Ambassador cited the American-French relationship. At the moment there were several aspects of French policy with which the United States strongly disagreed, i.e., the independent nuclear deterrent, certain attitudes toward [Page 178] NATO, opposition to British participation in the Common Market, and policy toward Communist China and Southeast Asia. It could be expected that America would oppose France on all these issues, but neither the United States nor France assumed that such opposition called into question the basic and longstanding Franco-American tie.
The Ambassador suggested that this approach could be taken toward the U.A.R. It was inevitable that both the United States and the U.A.R. would find it necessary to oppose specific policies adopted by the other. Egypt had long opposed American policy toward Israel, while in recent months the United States had been in opposition to U.A.R. policy on foreign bases and the British position in South Arabia. But opposition on such specific issues need not continuously call into question the basic mutual and continuing interests on which a lasting American-Egyptian policy could be built.
During the past three years a good beginning had been made in identifying and supporting these basic and mutual interests. If this support could be continued, the United States might be able to enjoy a reasonable and long-term relation with the U.A.R., yet retain freedom of movement on specific issues.
The President inquired as to whether President Nasser would understand such a sophisticated policy. The Ambassador replied that he thought the chances were reasonably good for its acceptance. During a long and cordial farewell visit with President Nasser on June 7,2 the Ambassador had advanced this view in detail. After discussing some aspects of it, President Nasser had replied that this was probably “the only possible policy between the two countries.” The Ambassador recognized that it would be difficult for some Americans to understand this approach—and even more difficult for some Egyptians. Nevertheless, it was the only alternative to the “off-again, on-again, gone-again” relation which had vexed the two countries during the past 12 years.
In concluding the interview, President Johnson suggested that he might wish to communicate with President Nasser as a result of this talk with Ambassador Badeau. With this, interview closed.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and Badeau and approved by the White House on July 23. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 1:02 to 1:16 p.m. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 71 and footnote 4 thereto.↩