Office of the Historian

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1

Washington, May 30, 1964, 1:09 p.m.

5592. Ref Deptel 5567.2 We particularly want you to emphasize mischievous role of UAR missile program in pushing arms rivalry to new and dangerous levels, as covered in previous guidelines. We recognize of course thin line between insuring Nasser understands and appreciates nature of this escalation and on other hand giving him impression Israel about to go nuclear with our understanding and tacit support. We therefore leave to you best means of convincing Nasser this is game he cannot win because of Israel’s technological development and access to outside financial sources.

Moreover, we think it important he be made to realize, in way he will not resent, fact that he must shoulder large share responsibility for arms race in general. His periodic opening of “icebox” door (cite cases) has let out blasts of cold air that put great psychological pressure on Israelis to obtain deterrent. We are not trying to justify Israeli actions to him; we are merely explaining them and his responsibility.

Essential facts are:

(1)
UAR was first to opt for surface to surface missile force.
(2)
UAR is continuing to develop SSMs.
(3)
Reports are that Israel in response is also acquiring SSMs.
(4)
Once possessed of SSMs and confronted with a growing UAR missile force, Israel might well seek to develop more lethal warheads to provide deterrence against implacable Arab hostility it senses from Arab public statements.
(5)
We believe Israel can be persuaded not to proceed further with SSM development if UAR willing to demonstrate restraint.
(6)
Otherwise, we fear race will inexorably escalate.
(7)
But no good purpose served by such escalation. Situation is obviously self-defeating for both sides. Not only does it make for greater danger of war, it also diverts resources badly needed in development of more prosperous Arab nation. Moreover, US determined forestall aggression by either side, and has capability do so. So we wonder why either side should engage in wasteful expensive programs, which will not achieve any decisive military result.

Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes, cleared by Komer, and approved by Jernegan.↩
  2. Document 62.↩