Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

60. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 25, 1964.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-U.A.R. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Mustafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic

The following account of his conversation with the President² was provided by Ambassador Kamel.

The Ambassador said he had received a telegram from President Nasser conveying his very best wishes and high regards for the President and asking the Ambassador to convey his thanks to the President for his initiative in entering into correspondence with him. He was particularly touched by the President’s having done so during the sad days immediately after the death of President Kennedy. He instructed the Ambassador to stress his most earnest desire for good relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. and his great hopes that these would be consolidated on solid bases during the President’s Administration.

The Ambassador began his presentation with the following three points:

1. The Near East has great strategic and economic importance to the United States, ranking next to Western Europe in this respect.

2. Egypt, through the ages, has been the heart and mind of the Arab world.

3. The Middle East is passing through a deep and broad transitionary period, and its stresses and strains are not directly related to those of the cold war.

The Ambassador said that American relations with the Arab states of the Near East could be divided into two periods. The first ranging from the close of World War II to 1958, and the second from 1958 to the present. Prior to July 1958, relations with the Arabs had deteriorated because of:

1. The creation of Israel in the Arab heartland;

2. The backward-looking policies of U.S. allies, France and Great Britain;

3. The “with me or against me” policies of Mr. Dulles;

4. The refusal of the United States to provide arms requested by Egypt;

5. The fact and manner of withdrawal of the High Dam offer;

6. The tripartite aggression of 1956;

7. The Eisenhower Doctrine with its premise of a power vacuum existing in the Near East.

As a consequence of these factors:

1. The Soviet Union was provided an opportunity to expand its influence in the area.

2. Arab confidence in the United States was reduced to a new low.

3. The United States was identified with the alien intrusion of the Zionist state into the Arab World.

However, after July 1958, a creative and positive aspect emerged in American policies. American policies, recognizing the forces and trends in the area and adapting to them, achieved the following:

1. Not one Communist government arose in the area, despite political instability and sizeable Soviet military and economic assistance. Iraq and Syria, threatened with internal Communist takeover, were purged of Communism primarily through actions and influence of the UAR.

2. Economic and cultural relations of the Arabs with the West have expanded.

3. U.S.-U.A.R. cooperation in matters such as Yemen has developed.

a) There is hope of emergence of a modern intelligentsia in Yemen capable of managing Yemen affairs.

b) The Royal House of Saud has been stabilized; Saudi relations with the UAR restored and improved.

c) There has been no interference with Western oil interests. (The Ambassador noted that the British, following different policies, did not enjoy the position in the area which might have resulted from policies similar to those of the U.S.)

4. There is no broad anti-American sentiment in the area.

5. All major U.S. interests are intact.

6. The Arab-Israel conflict has been contained.

The Ambassador said that this latter factor had been enhanced by the understanding shown by President Kennedy of the merits of a policy of “freezing the Israel issue”, avoiding public statements which might exacerbate Arab sensitivities, and excluding the issue from U.S. domestic politics. He warned that at the present juncture Israel and American Zionists were “seeking to defreeze” the issue in order to embarrass American-Arab relations.

The visit of Prime Minister Eshkol came in the midst of a militant Israeli-Zionist campaign against U.S. policy. The New York Times recently noted that the Prime Minister was coming to seek arms, money, and a security guaranty. He actually, however, would seek to torpedo U.S.-Arab relations.

The Ambassador said that here the President asked what he thought the U.S. should do.

The Ambassador said he explained that in his opinion the Cuban confrontation of a year and a half ago had resulted in a detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, behind this facade the cold war continues. He had long thought the Soviets would concentrate their attack on American interests in the Near East. This was proving the case. To counter this attack, the following should guide U.S. actions:

1. Extreme caution in U.S. decisions involving relations with the Arab states.

2. Efforts to constrain Israel to adopt policies of restraint.

3. Positive efforts to continue the momentum of improved relations with Cairo.

In the latter connection, the Ambassador felt that the U.S. might take action to:

1. Moderate Zionist inspired attacks against the UAR in the Congress. Threats of aid withdrawal only create negative reactions in the UAR.

2. Get the British to bring about a normalization of relations with the UAR and the YAR.

3. Bring the UAR to the periphery of the free world alliance, primarily through increasing economic ties. A Western consortium to provide for UAR economic needs was essential. The U.S. must encourage and support the UAR desire for closer economic relations with the West.

The Ambassador summed up by saying evidence of U.S. desire to continue economic cooperation was even more important since yesterday’s announcement of massive USSR credits for the UAR. Continued cooperation plus efforts to preserve U.S.-Arab relations by freezing the Zionist question would ensure continually improving U.S.-U.A.R. relations. Only the Soviets will benefit if the Zionists succeed in disrupting relations between the Arabs and the U.S. The Ambassador stressed that direct correspondence between the President and President Nasser would be of great significance in ensuring good relations. The U.S. should use its good offices to improve U.A.R. relations with the British. The President need not worry about the Khrushchev-Nasser communique.³ The facts of the situation, not words, were important in foreign relations. Egypt will not abandon its policy of non-alignment. It is, however, important to note that the USSR has the same goal as Israel and the Zionists: disruption of U.S.-Arab relations. The interests of the U.S. and the free world call for a green light from the President for the Secretary of State and his aides to launch a more active and positive program to improve U.S.-Arab relations.

The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his expose and affirmed his interest in promoting relations between the U.S. and the Arabs. He noted that some elements introduced in yesterday’s communique seemed completely unnecessary. These elements took some explaining and could not be wished away. The paragraphs relating to U.S.-Cuban relations were particularly galling.

Ambassador Kamel suggested that words were unimportant and Americans should try rapidly to forget any unpleasant aspect of the communique. They should accept it calmly.

The President said he was quite willing to be calm about elements of the communique, provided President Nasser would agree to be quiet and calm about Prime Minister Eshkol’s visit.

The President asked the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that the United States would firmly oppose any aggression by Israel against the Arab states. The U.S. would oppose Israeli expansionism. By the same token, it would oppose any aggression against Israel. The President enjoined the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that Israel does not formulate American policy. At the same time, he would advise the Arabs not to “corner” Israel, for only the Communists could gain by this.

The President expressed his concern at the escalation in arms. He noted that the more military equipment was provided by the USSR to the Arabs, the more France provided to Israel. This spiral was both dangerous and expensive to those involved.

The President suggested that the UAR not concern itself too much with what Senator Gruening and others who were attacking U.S. policy toward the UAR were saying. He noted that these same men were attacking the President and his policy as well as the UAR. As he could not stop these attacks to protect himself, neither could he stop them in the interest of the UAR.

The President noted the importance of the U.S. base in Libya to the global defense posture of the U.S.

The President said that he agreed with most of the points made by Ambassador Kamel and would like very much to see him again. He suggested that the Ambassador telephone him when he felt it important to have an exchange of views.

The conversation lasted almost an hour.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by Davies. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 11:50 a.m. to 12:20 p.m., and Ambassador Kamel was accompanied by Jernegan. (Ibid.)
2. Bundy had recommended that the President see Kamel before the Eshkol visit as “political insurance with Nasser.” Kamel had met privately with President Kennedy in 1961 and had told former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson that he had Nasser’s authority to have a similar private interview with Johnson if he was invited. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, May 6; ibid., National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I)
3. The communique was issued at the conclusion of Chairman Khrushchev’s May 9–25 visit to the United Arab Republic, where he took part in ceremonies marking the completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam. Telegram 2836 from Cairo transmitted highlights of the communique. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US) In an informal conversation with Kamel prior to his meeting with the President, Komer and Jernegan remonstrated with him about the communique, noting that it had touched on almost every issue that was or could be a source of U.S.-UAR friction. (Telegram 5538 to Cairo, May 27; ibid.)