Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, April 21, 1967, 5:34 p.m.

180013. Beirut 9598.²

1. We are encouraged by President Helou’s interest in considering CCC and PL–480 proposals as reported reftel. Reaction not as negative as anticipated. We therefore are looking forward to results your subsequent conversation with Foreign Minister Hakim. We are anxious move ahead as fast as possible.³

2. On other hand, we are disturbed by Helou’s analysis of Lebanese political situation. In particular, his apparent assessment that moderates might be relinquishing initiative to anti-Western elements seems unduly pessimistic. We tend to feel that Helou failed to mention those groups in Lebanon (including military) whom, we feel, would not stand by idly in face of bid for power for Left. We recognize that Lebanon is probably now in a political drift and that continued reluctance to stand up to those who seek to undermine its integrity might entail a relinquishment of that integrity. However, we feel situation need not necessarily lead to disintegration of forces which have held Lebanon together, particularly if moderates are given positive leadership. It had been our understanding that most political leaders were in agreement that extremism must be contained for sake of Lebanon’s future welfare.

3. We would therefore appreciate receiving the Embassy’s analysis of President Helou’s assessment, and its projection of Lebanon’s political future in the light of that analysis. In particular, (a) will responsible political leaders allow the present drift to get out of hand? (b) Is existing power structure seriously threatened? What are the alternatives? How would these alternatives affect U.S. interests? (c) Will those who have benefited most under Lebanon’s system of private enterprise be unwilling to accept larger degree of control over their power and wealth as insurance against extremism? (d) Will net effect of knowledge of “massive Soviet aid offer” referred to by Helou be strengthening or weakening of moderates? (e) What would be political impact in Lebanon if Soviet projects carried out? (f) Would existing power structure accept a significant Soviet bloc influence in Lebanon?⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL LEB. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon and approved by Davies.
2. Document 408.
3. Telegram 9663 from Beirut, April 21, reported that Hakim informed Porter on April 20 that Helou wanted to accept the U.S. offer. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 12–3 LEB) After further negotiations, Porter informed Hakim on May 18 of U.S. approval of a $12 million line of CCC credit for purchase of up to 150,000 metric tons of wheat between May 1967 and June 30, 1968. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 9869 from Beirut, April 27, conveyed the Embassy’s analysis. It stated that although most Lebanese political leaders preferred to follow a pro-Western neutrality, this was a difficult task when the Egyptians, Syrians, and Soviets were attacking the United States for a variety of reasons, including policy toward Israel, Vietnam, and aid to the UAR; it would be impossible if the Soviets offered sizable aid to Lebanon and the United States did nothing. The Embassy thought no Lebanese Government could survive turning down Soviet aid under those circumstances. It concluded that if the United States sought to retain the advantages it derived from Lebanon’s free economic and political systems and pro-Western stance, it would have to provide support along the lines requested by the Lebanese leadership. (Ibid., POL LEB)