Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

409. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, April 20, 1967, 1631Z.

9599. Subject: US Sixth Fleet.

1. During the course my discussion with President Charles Helou April 18, I raised issue of present propaganda attacks levied upon Sixth Fleet and its presence in Mediterranean. Referred to Eshkol statement² and took basically same line with President as I did with Foreign Minister Hakim April 17 (see Embtel 9452).³ Reiterated that unauthorized statement by a leader of a given state does not constitute United States policy. With due recognition to existence free press in Lebanon, expressed distress over unbridled propaganda attacks against United States and against Sixth Fleet visits Lebanon by radical Lebanese papers and few Lebanese politicians.

2. Explained to Helou that purpose Sixth Fleet in Med twofold: (1) oppose Communist aggression, (2) safeguard peace in area. Pointed out raison d’etre Sixth Fleet had to be viewed in this context. Fleet not here to protect any particular state, but to forestall aggression.

3. Helou stated Lebanon played instrumental role in Arab League in avoiding all criticism of presence nuclear weapons in Mediterranean. Helou commented if he could “press a button” to stop attacks of politicians and newspapers against US and Sixth Fleet he would do so immediately. Stated “I am not King Hussein, nor King Feisal, nor President Nasser, I am the Chief of State of Lebanon”. Referred to confessional nature Lebanon’s society and stated he obliged play much more delicate role in facing various propaganda attacks which emanate from inside and outside of Lebanon. Said he had to take into consideration views of various Lebanese confessional groups and commented “half the population of Lebanon looks to Nasser and Atassi” for leadership. Said he must work within these limitations.

4. Helou asserted US must recognize Prime Minister Karame’s position. Explained that Karame, as Sunni leader, facing domestic political opposition which ready take advantage any opportunity to bring pressure to bear against Karame government. Helou said if pressures emanating from Cairo and Damascus added to local pressures Karame faces, Karame would find himself in most difficult situation in maintaining himself in power. Nonetheless, Helou said had discussed question with Karame to try to forestall action which would aggravate problem of future Sixth Fleet visits.

5. I made it clear to Helou that if Syria’s so-called “government” able to pressure Lebanon into actions which might mean practical withdrawal Sixth Fleet from Eastern Mediterranean, this would appear have tragic consequences not only for Lebanon but for peace in the area as a whole.

6. Helou said unfortunately no delineated border exists between Lebanon and Syria and as consequence there is not only unauthorized physical passage across borders but also free passage ideas and propaganda. Helou tied issue Sixth Fleet visits to US policy of assistance to Lebanon and said Karame needs help. Explained that if GOL could point to tangible US assistance offer to Lebanon, situation of GOL would be much easier in respect to staving off mounting pressures for cancelling Sixth Fleet visits (see Embtel 9598).⁴

7. I reiterated to Helou that it basically in Lebanon’s interest have Fleet visits and only Cairo, Damascus, and other states interested in eliminating US presence in garble would stand to gain if Lebanon refused visits.

Comment: Helou has of course always been staunch supporter Sixth Fleet visits, and needs no reminders of significance of Fleet to Lebanon. His inability, for the first time, to give me flat reassurances that visits will continue, is indication of the hard political dilemma with which he (and Lebanon) are faced.

9. Nonetheless, GOL is trying hard keep Sixth Fleet issue from coming to head. Cancellation of general Parliamentary debate April 19 through lack of quorum undoubtedly Karame ploy to avoid taking public position in response to inevitable hostile questioning. He will have take hard line position, against his better judgment, if pressures become too intense, but will probably hold out for a while longer in hope US assistance offer will enable him show tangible evidence US support for GOL’s economic and social objectives.

10. This is going to be another typically Lebanese issue where the final decision will be based largely on external influences and only secondarily on rational self-interest of the country.⁵

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US. Confidential. Received at 2:49 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Moscow,CINCSTRIKE, Tel Aviv, CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, COMSIXTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, CTG 60.2, and the Department of Defense.
2. Reference is to a statement made by Eshkol in an interview that appeared in U.S. News and World Report. In response to a question whether he would expect help from the United States if Israel were attacked in force by its neighbors, he stated that Israel would rely primarily on its own army but that he would expect help “especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel. We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: ‘Don’t spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.’ My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own.” (U.S. News and World Report (Vol. LXII, No. 16), April 17, 1967, p. 76)
3. Telegram 9452 from Beirut, April 17, reported that in a meeting that day, Hakim urged a public U.S. refutation of the Eshkol statement. Porter told him the United States could not constantly engage in public debate over statements by leaders of other states and assured him that U.S. policy toward the Middle East as stated by President Kennedy and other leaders had not changed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US)
4. Document 408.
5. Telegram 10510 from Beirut, May 15, reported that Helou informed Porter that day that area developments and pressures on the Karame government led him to the reluctant decision to postpone a U.S. carrier group visit scheduled for May 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 LEB–US)