407. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Washington, April 20, 1967.
SUBJECT
- Your Meeting with Mr. Feinberg at 11:30 a.m.2
I have sent you a separate memo on the Israeli aid package.3 I recommend you not give
Abe any answers until you have discussed this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. Your options on timing are:
- 1.
- Hold the whole package until after we get the report on our Dimona
inspection about 28 April.
- 2.
- Release everything in the package except your decision on APC’s until we’re sure the Israelis
have cooperated fully with our inspection team.
- 3.
- Release the whole package now.
The main reason for holding off is to demonstrate that you’re serious about
nuclear non-proliferation. Even this year’s whole aid package wouldn’t be
enough to bargain with on this life-or-death issue
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(as Israel sees it). However, as we approach the time
when we may need to press Israel to sign the NPT, we must consider how much leverage we need to hold in
reserve. So far the Israelis have succeeded in keeping this apart from the
rest of our relationship.
The only counter big enough to sway Eshkol, I suspect, will be the US-Israeli relationship
itself. By purely foreign policy standards, we should be drawing back a
little now to signal how seriously we take this issue. I realize this
creates a domestic dilemma, but I should think the Jewish community itself
with its liberal tendencies would be strongly attracted to the NPT.
Israel has never leveled with us on its nuclear intent. Our intelligence
people have scattered—but as yet unconfirmed—evidence that Israel is quietly
but steadily placing itself in a position to produce nuclear weapons on
short notice. We also know that Israel is investing large sums in a French
built surface-to-surface missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead. I must
emphasize that we do not know exactly what Israel is doing or what its
position on the NPT will be. But we know
enough to be seriously concerned. Therefore, it may be wise to take special
care with each step this year.
Attachment4
Washington, April 20, 1967, 10:10
a.m.
Mr. President:
Hal Saunders and I have staffed
out the paper done by Dave Ginsburg.5 I wanted you to have, as he did
them during the night, Hal’s direct comments on the paper6—including
their flavor. Hal is an extremely well-balanced analyst of the Middle
East.
I would divide my own comments in two parts: first, the items in David’s
paper which we had planned already to support or could support; second,
our security relations with Israel.
- 1.
- This is the position with respect to David’s non-military
proposals:
- —Food purchases: already provided for.
- —Development loans: EX–IM is the proper source, given
Israel’s level of income and foreign exchange position; but
there is no reason why Linder cannot be very
generous.
- —Stimulating Israeli fertilizer exports: provided for in
our package.
- —Repayment in commodities: a new proposal now being
staffed out. It seems possible to me, especially if Israel
would make the deal proposed by David in the first part of
paragraph 16 (p. 17).7
- —Exports to the U.S.: DOD
is pressing this as hard as it can; perhaps Bob
McNamara could press it a little
harder.
- —Desalinization: This should go forward urgently:
Jack Valenti
would be fine but, as with Eric Johnston, he might need to
put himself in the position to approach the Arabs with some
kind of parallel project in order not to damage his moving
picture interests in the Middle East. Such an approach was
not ruled out in the Bunker terms of reference; but it may
be more important for Jack than for Ellsworth. Katzenbach proposes Bowie;
but Dillon and others are possibilities.
- —An American University in Israel: Without intimate
knowledge, Hal’s marginal comment on page 15 seems wise;
namely, that it is unlikely we could create a new
institution up to high existing Israeli standards; but we
might increase our already substantial support for Israeli
institutions now in being. Nevertheless, an “American
University” in Israel might be looked at afresh.
- —Visits to Israel by high-level U.S. officials and a visit
to the U.S. by Eshkol
seem manageable.
- 2.
- Security problems.
- a.
- In general David’s paper does not recognize something
which the Israeli government does recognize even if
sometimes reluctantly; namely, the U.S. has legitimate
interests throughout the Middle East and the maintenance of
those interests is, by and large, in the long-run interest
of Israel, because, where our influence is strong, we
strengthen the hand of Arab moderates. It is odd that as
thoughtful a man as David should not have made this
point.
- b.
- Our critical problem with Israel is that they have wanted
the advantage of a U.S. guarantee but have simultaneously
wanted to maintain a military establishment which could be
effective if the U.S. guarantee did not operate in a crisis.
The technical reason for the Israel position is their
anxiety about a quick Arab strike against them—from the air
or on the ground—which we might be too slow to deal with. It
is this ambiguity which has, quite understandably, in some
ways led
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them to
build up their military establishment in ways which made it
easier for the Russians to have their offers of military aid
accepted in the Middle East. The APC question relates to this. Bob
McNamara and others think that APC purchases from the U.S.
might open up another round of Soviet military credit sales
to the Arabs in the Middle East. I am not sure that is
necessarily so if the APC’s
are moved in on a clear replacement basis. There is another
problem with certain members of Congress who have resisted
our being an active part of the Middle East arms
race.
- c.
- The nuclear question. This is critical for large U.S.
interests. We have been able to live with this ambiguous
Israeli defense policy in terms of conventional weapons.
Should they wish to have both a national nuclear capability
and U.S. guarantees, we would be in an almost impossible
position. Moreover, if they insisted on it, it might well
destroy the possibilities of a non-proliferation treaty
throughout the world. Therefore, we must develop a much
deeper understanding with them on the nuclear question if we
are to proceed with a policy of being, quite openly and
without apology, their friends.