Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, April 7, 1964, 12:30 p.m.

1020. Feldman and I saw PriMin Eshkol for ninety minutes morning April 6. Eshkol attended by Mrs. Meir, Yahil, Kollek, Arad and Lubrani [garble—met?] with us. Major subjects were tanks, Israel’s overall defense policy, missiles, weapons financing, Eshkol’s June meeting with President Johnson, desalination and IAEA inspections. Last two topics being reported separately.² Following summary, topically rearranged in part, omits some familiar GOI argumentation employed in PriMin’s forcefully made presentation.

1. Tanks. Eshkol glad USG officials are acknowledging Israel’s need to modernize its tank force. Where does Israel’s request stand? Eshkol compared Israel’s inventories of various categories of conventional weapons with weapons held by UAR and Near East Arab countries. Threats by Nasser and others such as Ben Bella must be viewed against growing weaponry gap. Israel needs 500 modern tanks; “We’ll start with 300.” US is only possible provider. British Centurions not available in adequate number, AFG Israel wants better tanks, ones to last until early 1970s. French tanks, when available, much too expensive. Could Feldman give GOI some consolation now on tank request, which of utmost importance?

Noting some variance between USG and GOI figures on weapons presently in area, Feldman said tanks would be appropriate subject for June meeting. He stressed non-partisan nature of US special commitment to Israel’s defense. Israel asks that we evidence this deep commitment more. Obviously we cannot have an alliance nor an inflexible defense guarantee. As last April’s crises showed, US is prepared intervene quickly. Other steps might be taken; perhaps there could be additional contacts between our military experts.

US wishes avoid significant area arms imbalance in either direction; if Israel attained clear military superiority a dangerous escalation would surely ensue. Feldman said we recognize Israel’s need for modern tanks.

After discussion of missiles (see 3 below), Eshkol again tried pin Feldman down on tanks. Feldman again acknowledged Israel’s need, but said no decision taken by USG as to source of supply. He asked if Israel’s objective is not so much that US supply tanks, as to get tanks; possibly other sources would be cheaper. Eshkol said he open to suggestion; maybe would be better for both of us if tanks came from non-US source. However, tanks from US would strengthen US commitment to Israel in Arab eyes.

2. Defense policy. Eshkol voiced appreciation of US public assurances (and on my reminder) of private Presidential assurances. But Israel’s “basic philosophy” is autoemancipation of surviving Jews; self-labor and self-defense. USG says its protective umbrella covers Israel but “we must stand on own feet and be able to touch the umbrella.” More bilateral military consultations would be good. However, PriMin expressed doubt that, if UAR attacked Israel and Soviets supported UAR, US would necessarily intervene with force on Israel’s behalf.

Also, future US administrations might have different views on Near East.

I reminded PriMin that (1) absolute security does not exist, (2) even US security relies significantly on our friends, (3) our commitment to Israel is fundamental no matter what US political changes occur.

Feldman said we agree we want to keep balance of forces in Near East.

3. Missiles. Eshkol and Feldman had spirited exchange as to degree of threat posed by UAR missile program, and Israel’s reaction. PriMin said UAR would have 900 missiles in three or four years. Feldman replied this impossible.

Eshkol: We know US is unhappy with us on missiles; cannot understand why.

Feldman: Missiles Israel is buying from France will accelerate arms race; they are very much better than anything Nasser could have for years.

Eshkol: UAR is first in jets including bombers, navy and tanks. How does US know Egyptian missiles will not be markedly improved soon?

Feldman: PriMin can be sure if Israel gets superior missiles, UAR will get better ones.

Eshkol: Why should we always step back? We will have merely “a few dozen” missiles in year or two.

I noted PriMin still talking in terms of direct equations, overlooking striking power of Sixth Fleet.

Eshkol: Therefore my stress on our defense philosophy. If Israel attacked, Washington’s natural tendency would be to take matter to UN, wait few days, ascertain Moscow’s reaction. Meantime, many Israelis killed. “We must be here to help you; we must absorb first shock.” I again observed timing of Sixth Fleet’s counterpunch not a crucial factor; knowledge that it would come will deter UAR.

Eshkol said US means well but fails understand situation. “If I could believe you could persuade Nasser to stop on his missiles or else Israel will get better missiles…But US does not succeed in persuading Nasser.” Look at Yemen, where UAR troops gaining valuable experience. UAR has employed mortars in gas warfare. Is USG certain UAR will not put gas warheads on its missiles?

Feldman reiterated USG has different appraisal UAR missile threat. Both our experts and Israel’s agree Egyptian missiles are now primitive. PriMin speculated Nasser building push-button weapons to compensate for Israelis’ man-for-man fighting superiority. He begged USG “not to exaggerate intelligence of our men.” Feldman said it impossibe for UAR to become serious push-button attacker for years. He warned that Eshkol will not be able to convince President’s military advisors that US appraisal of missile threat is wrong. After deliberating, Eshkol said “then we are in bad situation.”

During further Eshkol-Feldman exchange on missiles, Feldman stressed dangers of Israel’s forcing pace of sophisticated missilery in Near East. PriMin said it “almost inhuman” to ask Israel to foreswear missiles. Feldman urged that before Israel acquired missiles on large scale it consult with us. Eshkol promised consult if “we go into hundreds.” Later he said consultation might be appropriate if Israeli acquisitions exceed range of “few dozens” already contracted. Re number of French missiles Israel has already ordered, Eshkol said “Maybe five more or ten less than 25; about one or two or three dozen.”

PriMin made clear Israel would be glad to stop missile acquisition if UAR ceased its missile program. He asked USG to “keep going to Nasser” on missile problem not to concentrate wholly on dissuading Israel.³

4. Weapons financing. Early in our talk Eshkol decried US “over optimistic” analyses of Israel’s capability to pay much for more weapons. Sure, Israel has 700–800 million dollar balance, but it owes vast sums in dollars. In 1965 foreign trade gap will be $400–450 million. If USG “denies, denies, denies, we will sell everything we have to gain security”, Eshkol said.

Near meeting’s end PriMin said he hoped talk of USAID clear-out untrue. Israel must buy missiles; US can help financially on tanks. Dollar drain for (French) jets enormous. 60–70 Mirages cost Israel “much more” than $100 million, plus spare parts and cost of training “there”. Eshkol reminded us that as MinFinance he had opposed Hawk deal. I noted GOI nevertheless approved deal. PriMin promised provide Feldman with precise figures on Israel’s outstanding dollar obligations for military hardware.

5. June 1 meeting. Having set guidelines for consideration of tanks, missiles and desalination, Feldman said President may wish also discuss Jordan waters problem. Mrs. Meir said question of Maqarin Dam capacity would be worth focus.

Eshkol said in view UAR missile threat and opposition and press realization thereof, when he returns from Washington he must have “something to tell the people”. (Deputy PriMin Eban and others are pushing this line too.)

Feldman said another worthwhile topic could be general NE area relations. (Israelis did not comment on this point at this meeting, but later Assistant DirGen Herzog discussed long-range NE policies with Feldman.)

Feldman said Palestine refugees also might be discussed, although he doubted if anyone had come up with workable new idea. I commented it difficult to discuss Israel’s relations with its neighbors without reference to important refugee problem. Eshkol said only solution is resettlement; Cyprus has taught GOI a lesson. Also, USG should give more money directly to host governments rather than a UNRWA.

Mrs. Meir said she already drafting direct negotiations draft res for next GA. Feldman remarked she could spend her time more profitably otherwise.

Feldman several times noted Eshkol’s time with President will be limited to about an hour, thus important to concentrate on most vital issues. Yahil suggested if USG wishes discuss refugees, PriMin might do so with Secretary Rusk rather than President.

Feldman recommended Eshkol not be specific in publicly claiming any accomplishments, especially re tanks, as result visit to US. PriMin agreed.

As meeting broke up it was agreed our call on Eshkol would be described to press as for general discussion his June visit.

Recommend Department repeat most if not all of this message to recipients Depcirtel 1791.⁴

Barbour

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ISR–US. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 1022 from Tel Aviv, April 7. (Ibid., E 11–3 ISR)
3. Telegram 1021 from Tel Aviv, April 7, reported that in a meeting with Eban later on April 6, Feldman emphasized the danger to the Near East region if Israel were to put nuclear weapons on the missiles it was acquiring, noting that the United States felt very strongly about this, although he had been diverted from stressing it with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 1033 from Tel Aviv, April 9, reported that in a meeting on April 7, Deputy Defense Minister Peres reiterated Israeli willingness to abandon missile acquisition if Nasser halted his program, but that Feldman and Barbour had concluded there was virtually no hope of persuading the Israelis to eschew a missile program. (Ibid.)
4. Circular telegram 1791, March 26, sent to 14 posts in the Near East and North Africa and to London, informed the recipients that the Department was preparing a study on the question of Israeli arms requests and requested comments. (Ibid., DEF 19–3 US–ISR)