369. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Mr. President:

Nick and I saw Feinberg, Krim, and David Ginsburg who happened to be in New York.

We went through the scenario, as you directed. They all indicated at the end that they thought it would be manageable not only with the Israelis but with their friends here. They intend to get to work much as they did on the earlier Jordan package.2

[Page 724]

We assume Arthur saw the Israeli Ambassador today.3 I will let you know as soon as I have a report.

I will see Abe Feinberg tomorrow here in Washington.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential.
  2. A December 13 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow expressed his “disquiet” at the handling of the “Jordan package.” He stated that although the package was small and defensive and represented the minimum necessary to meet King Hussein’s political requirements, the delay in reaching a decision had seriously weakened its impact, weakened Khammash’s faith in the United States as a reliable friend, and downgraded his stature in the King’s eyes. Such details, he commented “do not receive the attention they deserve when the President writes the details of the scenario.” He complained that Rostow and Katzenbach had had “to rush off to New York on a blizzardy afternoon, leaving State headless,” to talk to the Jewish community, and asked, “Is there no way to stiffen the President’s will and enliven his memory concerning all we have already done for Israel, so that he (and you and Secretary Rusk and Nick) is not victimized in this way?” (Ibid., Name File, Wriggins Memos)
  3. Telegram 3188 from USUN, undated, received on December 14, stated that in accordance with Goldberg’s telephone conversation with Katzenbach, he had briefed Israel’s UN Representative Comay along the lines of the Katzenbach memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN)