Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–751–66

Washington, December 5, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Military and Supporting Assistance for Jordan (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–28025/66, dated 28 November 1966,² subject as above, which requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on further military actions which the United States should take to assist the Government of Jordan.

2. (S) The internal crisis in Jordan which has arisen in the wake of the 13 November 1966 Israeli attack requires additional prompt responses on the part of the US Government to restore stability and bolster King Hussein. The stability of the regime and the maintenance of order are dependent upon the loyalty and effectiveness of the Armed Forces. In order to insure their continued support, any assistance to Jordan must be of such impact that it will demonstrate to the Armed Forces, the civilian population and the Middle East as a whole, that King Hussein has the active support of the US Government.

3. (S) The most immediate and probably the strongest impact action that the United States could take would be to suspend arms shipments to Israel. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the statement made by Secretary of State Rusk to the Israeli Ambassador on 21 November 1966³ that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring reexamination of decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should another incident occur under similar circumstances, the United States should suspend the sale and deliveries of military equipment to Israel.

4. (S) King Hussein has stated that a requirement exists to improve internal security and Jordanian defensive capabilities by increasing the pay of enlisted personnel, increasing the size of the Armed Forces, and the addition of new equipment. In developing their views on these matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the Military Assistance Program to Jordan, the recommendations of the Country Team, and the urgent Jordanian requirements as presented to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by General Khammash.

5. (S) The complete list of equipment submitted by General Khammash is beyond Jordan’s ability to operate and maintain effectively and would entail a heavy financial burden. Although it is impractical for the United States to furnish all of the equipment requested, a more modest equipment package should be provided which would assist in deterring future Israeli border raids, improve Jordan’s border defenses, and have a less adverse impact on the Jordanian economy.

6. (S) Attached at Appendix A⁴ is a proposed package, which, with a pay increase, would meet, in part, the most pressing security needs of Jordan as expressed by General Khammash and provide an important psychological impact. As proposed by the referenced memorandum, this package has been developed without regard to planned financial ceilings on military and supporting assistance for Jordan. Cost of the equipment package is approximately $12.8 million. It would entail an increase of approximately 11,400 personnel, of which 4,500 would be part-time border village guards. Addition of these personnel and approval of a 25 percent pay raise would require an estimated $11.1 million increase in annual Jordanian defense expenditures. Armaments and equipment proposed in the package would produce no significant change in the arms balance in the Middle East. Additional military measures which could be taken to assist the Government of Jordan are also contained in Appendix A. A recapitulation of the arms and equipment package is contained in Appendix B. The equipment list submitted by General Khammash, annotated, where possible, with price and availability, is contained in Appendix C.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the provisions of the package require diversions of equipment from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Korea and other countries and consider that the United States should not unilaterally make these diversions, but rather the agreement of these countries should be sought.

8. (S) In reference to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–28187/66, dated 3 December 1966,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States take action now on the package proposed herein and not defer action due to dispatch of survey teams. Further comment on this memorandum will be provided concerning their views on the option for Jordan to purchase additional F–104 aircraft and the dispatch of a high-level mission or an air defense survey team to Jordan.⁶

9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The United States support in principle the Armed Forces pay increase proposed by General Khammash. However, before assuming this recurring annual cost, every effort should be made to obtain the necessary money from other Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

b. The United States provide to the Government of Jordan the arms and equipment package proposed in Appendix A and support the attendant increase in personnel.

c. The United States take the additional military measures contained in Appendix A.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that the memorandum was seen by the Secretary.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 343.
4. The appendices are not printed.
5. Not found.
6. JCSM–758–66, a JCS memorandum of December 7 to Secretary McNamara, provided the comments. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP) JCSM–765–66, a JCS memorandum of December 9 to McNamara, provided further comments on the question of aid to Jordan. (Ibid.)