352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1
93329. 1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. Memcon2 is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.
[Page 691]2. In meeting with General Khammash afternoon Nov 29, Secretary expressed distress at situation which had brought Khammash to Washington, stated President and he have devoted much time to this problem and said he grateful for King’s message, which Khammash delivered.3 USG well aware of details Nov 13 Israeli raid and had made known in both Israel and SC our view that Israeli action was wrong and misguided.
3. Khammash said as Chief of Staff it difficult be absent from Jordan at this time, but King Hussein felt it important convey at high level GOJ view of situation and corrective measures needed. Israeli raid, largest since 1956, had revealed Jordan defenses inadequate and adversely affected morale of Army. He had initially thought Israeli attack was beginning of invasion and had considered ordering return strike. If he had, area could have been plunged into war.
4. Khammash said while GOJ could cope with present demonstrations, they were most serious Jordan had experienced and revealed depth of popular feeling. Jordan now subject propaganda attacks from Syria, UAR and PLO. Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily and protected by USSR. In this situation Jordan was turning to its friend the United States. Must be understood that Nov 13 incident unlike incidents in past and situation would not return to normal if nothing was done. If USG unable to help, King faced with choice of (a) dying in Battle with Israel rather than at hands of own people, (b) becoming hero by turning to Soviets for military equipment or (c) abdicating. If Jordan received equipment requested and money to pay for enlarged Army, all would be well. This connection Khammash asserted Jordanian officers sufficiently sophisticated to tell difference between real and token help.
5. In response Secretary’s question whether opinions differed between East and West Bank in this matter, Khammash replied sense of defeat equally strong among all Jordanians. Only difference was that East Bank less vulnerable to Syrian,UAR and PLO propaganda. Jordan had been subject to such propaganda before but situation created by Nov 13 attack had made elements of population more responsive than previously.
6. Secretary enquired re King’s personal safety. Khammash said King for present could depend on loyalty of armed forces. If nothing done, however, Nov 13 might in time become Jordan’s new national day.
[Page 692]7. Secretary stressed he could not overstate gravity with which we viewed Israeli attack. Another such attack would have most serious consequences and there no doubt in Israel about this. At same time, he wanted emphasize two points: in our view attack (1) did not reflect Israeli scheme to seize West Bank and (2) was not aimed at King Hussein. He therefore could not comprehend how Israel failed to foresee consequences for King.
8. Secretary continued that US has strong fraternal feeling for His Majesty and interest in well being of Jordan. We would take urgent look at Jordan’s request. While he could not comment in detail pending consultations with Defense colleagues, there was no question about our policy of support for Jordan.
9. Secretary said he now frankly more concerned about Syria and UAR than Israel. Did Khammash see any connection between recent Syrian-UAR security pact4 and current situation? Khammash said in his view it was USSR which brought those two countries together. Secretary commented that, while we had not discussed latest incident with Soviets, we had held discussions with them regarding Near East in UN context and he had discussed possibility of slow-down in arms race with Gromyko. We had, however, found no interest on Soviet side.
10. Secretary emphasized President deeply concerned re Israeli attack Nov 13 and had conveyed his views to Israel through more than one channel. Khammash responded that high GOJ officials do not doubt USG position but Jordan public disillusioned. It seemed to GOJ that only Jordan, which had longest frontier with Israel, was victim of “balance of strength” policy. Israel could get military equipment it wanted from various sources and UAR, Syria and Iraq could get theirs from Soviets. USG must show it won’t let its friends down. Having already invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan, USG must now judge how much Jordan is worth to it.
11. Secretary expressed hope Jordan’s security problems could be met without interfering with GOJ development program. At this point he could only say we would have to see what can be done and would be as responsive as possible. Secretary noted that, just as Israel found it difficult guard against terrorism, Jordan undoubtedly realized that complete security not easy to guarantee. Khammash concurred, saying principal need was increased mobility and firepower to improve defense. Secretary said we were looking into possibility that techniques developed in Viet Nam might be applicable in detecting intrusions [Page 693] across Jordan-Israeli border. Khammash replied GOJ list included early warning system but equipment could not be too sophisticated in order permit rapid assimilation by Army.
12. Khammash noted GOJ had been subjected to repeated USG inquiries regarding stationing tanks on West Bank—a restriction not applicable to Israel. This had had unfortunate effect and he hoped subject would not be brought up again. Secretary said he appreciated problem and would give it further thought. In conclusion, Secretary assured Khammash we felt sense of solidarity with Jordan and would give GOJ request most serious attention.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN.↩
- Not found.↩
- A copy of the King’s letter is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US.↩
- During talks held in Cairo November 1–7 by Nasser and Syrian Premier Yussef Zayen, Syria and the UAR agreed to resume diplomatic relations and on November 4 signed a joint defense agreement.↩