350. Memorandum for the Record1
At the urgent request of UAR Ambassador Kamel, I called on him yesterday afternoon. He said he had asked me to come on a busy afternoon because of his extreme anxiety about the drift in US–UAR relations at a time of crisis in Near Eastern affairs. He had touched bases widely in the Department and in the White House without tangible results. He was aware that the Secretary would leave Washington December 4 for about two weeks and he feared the consequences if nothing occurred during that period.
The heart of his anxiety is the stalemate on consideration of a possible PL–480 agreement. Maintaining that the key to peace and stability in the Near East is the continuation of effective US–UAR relations, he urged that technical discussions of the PL–480 question begin before the end of the year. He pointed out that the UAR is receiving massive military and economic assistance from the Communists while pursuing independent nationalist policies. This was possible because a food-link was maintained with the West. Kosygin had told [Page 689] Nasser that Russia would meet the UAR food requirements if this proved necessary. Kamel believes that, if this occurs, the UAR will slip irrevocably into the Soviet camp with dire consequences for peace and Near East stability.
Despite the highly explosive situation which currently exists in the Near East, Kamel is confident that the area can be quieted down. He claims the UAR has no intent to bring Hussein down, since this would create a very dangerous situation for everyone in the area.
When I raised the Ford problem, Kamel said that Ford had stupidly created the problem and that it was now incumbent upon the UAR and US Governments, as well as Ford, to resolve the issues. He said Ford assets had been blocked under UAR law over a customs dispute. He had been in direct contact with Ford and the company is prepared to make certain payments and this issue appears negotiable. Regrettably the Arab League Boycott Committee had met in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli action against Jordan. Under these circumstances, no Arab Government could oppose the boycott proposals of the radicals.2 Nevertheless, some way could be found to get around this problem. He suggested that Eugene Black be authorized to raise it with Nasser when he sees him on December 1.
Turning to the question of the recent departmental reorganization he asserted that all Arab Ambassadors concurred that the new structure and arrangements were less satisfactory.
Deputy Executive Secretary
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Prepared on November 29.↩
- This portion of the conversation is recorded in more detail in telegram 92233 to Cairo, November 28. Kamel stated that the UAR Government had “long since” given up the notion that the Arab boycott was an effective weapon against Israel. He advised against a direct U.S. assault on the boycott apparatus and recommended that the companies involved take up matters with individual Arab governments. (Ibid., FT 11–2 ISR ARAB) Other documentation related to the boycott is ibid.↩