34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
4713. For the Secretary only from Talbot. In meetings Monday night and yesterday in Beirut with Ambassadors Meyer, Knight, Hart, Barnes and Barbour I found several of them rather discouraged by what they consider loss in recent weeks of gains we had made with Arabs over past three years. Root cause, they agreed, is outside our control; we have now begun to absorb anticipated and inevitable Arab reactions to our support of Israeli diversion of Jordan waters outside Jordan Basin. They expect higher pitch of anti-Israeli talk and possibly actions in months ahead, with substantial fallout of anti-Americanism.
They are especially concerned that sequence of recent official US speeches and actions has strongly accentuated Arab reactions. In euphoric aftermath of Cairo Conference Arabs, they said, had persuaded themselves that they could be masters in their own homes. Effect of Alexis Johnson and Weizmann Institute speeches was to suggest to Arabs that US asserting American intention of determining future pattern of area. This in Ambassadors’ opinion gave rise to so far unshakable Arab belief that “enlightened Kennedy policies have given way to Truman-like pro-Israeli policies.” It is obvious that accident of timing shortly after Cairo Conference plus superacute anxieties about policies of a new President reinforced Arab reactions.
Ambassadors concurred that cumulative signals coming out of Washington now, including Eshkol visit and talk of possible arms sales to Israel, could generate runaway Arab reaction unless we can find ways to balance overall impression. Knight talked seriously of possible need to evacuate American dependents. Meyer felt US goodwill in Lebanon undergoing great strain, with our friends under pressure to deny us. Barnes thought Hussein would have to emphasize Palestine question in forthcoming Washington visit in order live with fellow Arabs afterward. Except for Barbour, whose concerns are different, only Hart reported that his clients not particularly affected so far by anti-Americanism mood. He doubted however that Saudis would resist participation in Arab programs against Israel.
In earlier visit to Baghdad and Kuwait I had encountered similarly heightened sensitivity to Israel question in US-Arab relations. Ambassador [Page 80] Strong, who has found himself more deeply entangled in Israel question since Johnson [garble] two recent USG speeches than before, believes Iraqi posture will be determined in end by way Cairo decides to play Israel question and US-Arab relations. Ambassador Cottam finds Kuwaitis so anxious to be “good Arabs” they adopt rather strong line on Israel and US-Israeli relations.
Ambassadors of course did not need my reassurances of continuity of policy and naturally they demonstrated understanding of and loyalty to US policy. They questioned however whether Washington understands erosion already evident in US-Arab relations or sensitivity of Arabs to campaign oratory and especially to any consignment of arms this year to Israel. Understandably, they pleaded for utmost restraint in US policy statements on Near East in coming months.
Our Ambassadors acknowledged that Arabs had brought much on their own heads by heating up Israeli issue after Cairo Conference and coupling this with renewed campaign to eliminate Western bases from Eastern Mediterranean region. I would describe their mood not as critical of our policy but as disquieted by thought this is likely to be even more difficult year than they had anticipated. I believe they were encouraged after our meeting.
If you wish we can discuss this matter further when I return home later this week.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note of March 25 from Read to Rusk suggested sending copies to the White House, U. Alexis Johnson, and Jernegan. Rusk initialed his approval.↩