Office of the Historian

335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

Washington, November 15, 1966, 8:39 p.m.

85342. Subj: Israel-Jordan.

1.
Israeli Amb Harman called on Asst Sec Sisco Nov 15 to discuss Israel-Jordan SC case.
2.
Harman said Nov 11 mining incident was great shock to GOI which found no link between it and Syria but considerable evidence pointing to unruly elements in Hebron area who were cocking fists at everybody including SC, GOJ, and Israel. He said GOI had to consider the results if it did nothing and allowed these elements to operate with complete impunity. He denied retaliation was GOI objective and asked what Israel could do in situation where people were unsafe in their homes and on roads. We have no objectives against GOJ, he said, if they leave us alone, we will leave them alone.
3.
Amb said Israel wanted to avoid loss of life but operation didn’t go according to plan when Jordan Legion appeared on scene.
4.
He expressed hope our purposes for future could follow along common lines. Specifically a) that GOI and USG would regard Nov 13 incident as end not beginning of something; and b) a common position in SC.
5.
Re latter point, he said unbalanced treatment could have very bad and far reaching results in area. If after getting only watered down and vetoed resolution in SC against Syria GOI now gets knocked down for this attack, psychological and practical results in area would be disastrous. He made special plea against invidious comparisons between official and open acts by GOI and what Arabs claim were acts by “unofficial” bodies. He said Israel also could indulge in “unofficial” strikes if it wished to. GOI hopes attempt will be made in SC and in area to make last weekend the end and not beginning of something and that SC does not take action which lends encouragement to acts which led to present situation.
7.
Sisco said we are dismayed by Israeli attack. He said we thought both USG and GOI made out very well in Nov 4 SC case and noted GOI presented situation effectively to Israeli press and people. He recalled our repeated urging against retaliation strikes and noted our concern over the magnitude of IDF action.
8.
Frankly, Sisco continued, we do not understand why you chose to attack Jordan since we both know Government of Jordan was trying to control terrorism and Syria was the chief culprit.
9.
Sisco said USG is afraid this is not the end but the beginning. We are worried about effect of this situation on King Hussein and his government. He noted a) disarray in GOJ; b) disaffection in Jordan army on which King depends; c) consequent uncertainties of GOJ future policies; d) pressure on King to accept PLA unit which he has stoutly resisted in past; e) likely strong demand for arms by GOJ with resultant arms escalation.
10.
Sisco noted US policies based on King and Israeli attack may be the beginning of the deterioration of that whole policy—a matter of deep concern and mutual interest to both USG and GOI.
11.
Our primary concern he explained is what we can do to shore up King’s position and this concern is bound to have important ramifications on what we do in SC.
12.
NEA officer present then read Harman sections of Amman’s 11182 and commented that these reports indicated most serious anti-regime sentiments in recent times, even worse than April 1963. He noted GOI said attack was against terrorists but King and GOJ considered the attack against him and his regime. He said we had report directly from King noting his disillusionment and his belief his whole policy called into question.3 DeptOff noted it would take time for us to reestablish our relations with King and GOI’s relation with King through us.
13.
Sisco then concluded: GOI should expect two things in Council a) very strong statement by us and b) strong resolution. When Amb asked if it would be completely unbalanced, Sisco said he did not wish to go beyond that at this time.
14.
Harman returned to his principal theme that Israel could not be expected to stand by and to permit provocations against them and killing of its own citizens without responding. He also emphasized pattern and series of past incidents. Sisco said he fully appreciated that raid does not represent isolated incident and that serious problem has arisen as result pattern of incidents over previous weeks and months. However, fact is that recent large-scale retaliatory raid has given new dimension to problem. Situation could evolve in such way that King would be seriously weakened, which is neither in interest of US nor [Page 663] GOI. We would have to take this fact particularly into account as we determined course of action in SC.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by UNP Deputy Director Stephen Campbell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Jerusalem.↩
  2. Telegram 1118 from Amman, November 15, reported increased popular discontent and criticism of the Jordanian Government because of the Israeli raid. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 1105 from Amman, November 14, Burns reported a meeting with the King in which he spoke along these lines. (Ibid.)↩