Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1151Z.

949. Ref: State 42098.² Palestine refugees.

1. I conveyed paras 2A through 2H of reftel to Ambassador Rafael Sept 12. He subsequently passed to FonMin Eban who raised with me Sept 13.

2. Eban said we in “complex misunderstanding.” There not any Israeli “proposals.” Before Israel crystallized its thinking on this matter it wanted benefit our thoughts. This was not the end of GOI thinking on subject. GOI had not given six months to consideration of this matter, in fact it had not given six minutes. (By this he meant there had not been govt—Cabinet—consideration of ideas FonOff had had.) Eban continued this was rather “cold douche” on Israeli efforts to discuss problems like this with US in their early stages of consideration. Israel had never said it would try to rethink whole problem. What it was trying to do was find ways to give debate in UN new direction. It was inaccurate to say Israel had retreated from its earlier proposals. Israel in fact wanted to bring UN back to something like Resolution 513 of 1952 with its accent on rehabilitation and resettlement. UN position has steadily eroded in direction emphasis on para 11 and repatriation. If these tentative thoughts were non-starter then perhaps only thing left to do in UNGA was to try and hold the line.

3. I remarked that whatever exception might be taken to specifics of Dept reply mood of disappointment it conveyed was correct one. Absence of any mention of repatriation obviated at outset any broad UNGA support for these ideas. After six months and GOI despatch of high level envoy to discuss with the Secretary it reasonable for us expect something more forthcoming. (Eban interjected that 18 years had seen no progress on main issues. Israeli thought was to make progress on marginal aspects. “Palestinians coming across border with guns and knives” did not provide propitious climate for consideration these problems. Particularly difficult Israel come up with idea such as open ended $50,000,000 unilateral compensation.) I concluded that Dept remarks had been conveyed in spirit frankness that characterized our relations. There was erosion in Israeli positions in UN and while we were willing consult closely on tactics substance of what Israelis could offer was of overriding importance.

4. In subsequent brief conversation with Rafael, he confirmed Eban upset by Dept’s reaction. He added, as I had anticipated, that FonOff consideration had consisted of efforts rethink numerous possibilities previously advanced and that conclusion had been essentially that none of them starters this time. He, therefore, of opinion expressed by Eban that probably only tactic at UN is to hold current line with as little fanfare as possible. Objective of talks with US was and is to assure maximum possible tactical cooperation, since it apparently not possible to redirect emphasis of debate toward humanitarian, and away from political, aspects of problem.

Barbour

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL. Confidential.
2. Telegram 42098 to Tel Aviv, September 7, commented that the Israeli proposals described by Rafael to Hare, Sisco, and Rusk (see Document 310 and footnote 3 thereto) were “patently unacceptable.” The Israelis were proposing resettlement without repatriation, with the main cost to be borne by countries other than Israel, and they were asking the United States to assume the political liability of launching the plan. It instructed Barbour to tell Eban that the Department was “frankly disappointed” that after 6 months of deliberations, the Israeli Government had brought forth a proposal that seemed to be, if anything, a retreat from its former positions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF PAL)