321. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
Cairo, September 10, 1966,
0745Z.
1296. Former Treasury Secretary Anderson gave Blackiston2 resume at lunch September 9 his meeting President Nasser previous day. Meeting reported in press. Following points made by Nasser:
- 1.
- Yemen—We want to get out of Yemen but want firm agreement Saudis to insure non-restoration of Hamid Ed Din. Saudis only want verbal agreement this point. UAR fearful once its troops withdrawn Saudis will restore Imamate by force.
- 2.
- IMF—The IMF has been very hard in its negotiations with Dr. Kaissouni.
- 3.
- Food—The UAR food problem is critical. We must have wheat from abroad. Why did you cut it off abruptly? We could understand a gradual reduction but abrupt termination has made it impossible for us to plan for replacement. If you are our friend why have you done this? Do you want riots in the streets? We will get wheat from somewhere.
- 4.
- South Arabia—We have no designs on South Arabia. UAR has been giving no support to South Arabian nationalists other than money. We want British to meet with nationalists but they (British) have refused.
- 5.
- East-West balance—We must keep balance between East and West. If we lean too far in the direction of the East, we get complaints from you and if we go the other way, the Russians complain. The Russians gave us the High Dam and even supplied skilled workers when we did not have them. They sent wheat shipments when you stopped. These are the things we cannot forget.
- 6.
- Land reclamation—We now have the water from the High Dam to bring new lands into cultivation but we need help to develop areas like Salhia.
- 7.
- Subversion—They accuse me of having Nasserite agents in other countries of the Arab world. I have no organization and cannot control these people.
Secretary Anderson’s comments follow:
- 8.
- US–USSR relations—U.S. Government has no latent hostility to the UAR but what we can do for you is conditioned by UAR actions.
- 9.
- Armaments—We do not begrudge armaments. Every nation must have them, but the question is quantity and what you can afford.
- 10.
- IMF—The IMF is hard but it is composed of honest, dedicated, non-political people. I urge you to come to agreement with the IMF. It is the key to your problem. Without agreement all of your credit will dry up. Hard decisions are required. You have to decide for yourself where to cut.
- 11.
- Nuclear—Are you in favor of international safeguards? Yes. Can I then say this back in Washington? Yes.
- 12.
- Non aggression—Are you against aggression by any country in the Near East against any other country of the area? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes.
- 13.
- Salhia—If this is your great need are you prepared to devote all your available resources, plus what you may obtain from abroad, toward implementing this project? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes.
- 14.
- Public statements—You need to say what you have told me publicly (ref item 11, 12, 13 above). (Blackiston not entirely sure from recollection of conversation with Anderson whether latter stated Nasser committed himself to public statement or not. We hope have written memcon provided us early next week, and will forward to Washington on receipt.)
Anderson saw Kaissouni again morning September 9 and provided rundown his conversation with Nasser. According Anderson, Kaissouni expressed great appreciation for points which Anderson made and frankness with which they had been stated.
Nes