313. Letter From the Charge in the United Arab Republic (Nes) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)1
Dear Rodger:
Ever since arriving here a little more than a year ago, I have sought some way of breaking out of the ever tightening circle of our relations with the UAR occasioned by our own political realities on the one hand and the continuing foreign adventures of the UAR on the other. May I say that I have always been absolutely convinced of the necessity, if at all possible, of retaining the maximum Western position in the UAR. Frankly I am discouraged.
The following are my own comments and I have not discussed them with the staff:
- 1.
- Haikel’s 22 July article (Cairo 381) and Nasser’s 23 July speech (Cairo 388)2 could indicate that the UARG is no longer thinking in terms of an eventual affirmative U.S. response to their $150 million PL 480 food request and are preparing to act accordingly.
- 2.
- If this is true, and there is other evidence to substantiate such a conclusion, we may, indeed, be in for the “hot” summer Haikel referred to earlier.
- 3.
- Without the restraints imposed by food expectations and facing a deteriorating internal economic situation and an external financial crisis, we may see an increasing resort to foreign “adventures” such as terrorism in Saudi Arabia designed as a prelude to a “war of liberation” against the Faisal regime, greatly increased terrorism in Aden to force a British withdrawal and humiliation before 1968, renewal of the campaign against Wheelus Field and open support for North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong. This latter change from the official neutral attitude could be presaged in Nasser’s speech; “American hostile action against North Viet Nam is an obstacle to peaceful settlement—We must—denounce American hostile action—.”
- 4.
- Since there has been no discernible improvement in the overall climate of U.S.-UARG relations since the May IRG meeting, I believe Washington should reconsider whether it is really in our long range interests, if indeed we wish to continue to seek to achieve our more limited objectives in the Near East, to tie food for the UAR so tightly to its performance in the Arabian Peninsula. Are our interests there more important than preserving what remains of the U.S. and Western position in the UAR; is it really wise to use food as a club at all?
- 5.
- Since I have no solid regional basis for recommending any change in our tactics at this time, I wish only to reiterate the dangers which may flow from a starving, frustrated and desperate Egypt.
I would imagine that the IRG will again be meeting on the UAR food problem later in the summer and you might at that time like to stress, perhaps more forcibly than has hitherto been done, the very grave dangers involved in pushing Nasser into a financial and food corner. If we should embark upon a policy of endeavoring to replace him with a more moderate leadership in the UAR, this is of course another matter and one not supported in the current draft of our National Policy Paper.
Do not feel that you need reply to this letter. I write you only because I want to be sure that all factors involved in our current tactics toward Egypt should be seen in the light of their possible repercussions.
Sincerely,