Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, June 27, 1966, 7:09 p.m.

6689. 1. UAR Ambassador Mostafa Kamel upon return to Washington from leave and consultation in UAR told Department officer June 24 he found in Cairo atmosphere suspicion and fear of US intentions. Yemen prime issue facing UARG and many Egyptian officials believed US supporting King Faisal’s intransigent stand in order bring down Nasser regime. President Nasser thought UAR had satisfied major US needs through moderate constructive policies, i.e., a) nonaligned UAR position and avoidance close association with USSR and communism, b) US oil interests intact, c) Israel in “ice box.” US reluctance cooperate with UAR strengthened hand leftist elements anxious discredit Muhyadin government. In order gain ascendancy, these elements seeking undermine US–UAR relations and create climate that would prevent US sale wheat to UAR.

2. After enormous effort and at great risk to personal career, Kamel said he had convinced Nasser and key UAR officials of need for UAR give US clear evidence its desire improve relations.

3. Kamel cited as examples of past UAR actions indicative of desire cooperate with West:

a. Settlement of difficulties between UARG and Pan American Oil Company.

b. Offer to compensate damages to USIS Library.

c. UAR letter of intent to Westinghouse to arrange financing for construction nuclear power and desalting plant. (Apparently failure of International General Electric to arrange financing for this project has induced UARG to try its luck with Westinghouse.)

d. UARG decision purchase three Boeing aircraft for United Arab Airlines.

e. Submission of draft law to National Assembly to solve outstanding difficulties with Shell company.

f. Invitations to Davies, head of Food Machinery Corporation, and other US businessmen to visit UAR and interest them in participation economic development projects.

4. As measure continuing UAR desire for closer relations with West, Kamel said he authorized state:

a. UAR has no desire make UK position in NE difficult. UAR prepared help UK in orderly honorable withdrawal from South Arabia provided HMG complied with UN resolution. (Kamel feels UARG believes desirable resume diplomatic relations with UK, perhaps after discussion this issue at OAU conference Addis Ababa in September. Helpful UK attitude toward solution Yemen problem would do much facilitate resumption relations.)

b. UAR does not believe in making axis. If Faisal wants Islamic pact UAR not inclined respond by creation “progressive” axis, e.g., UAR, Syria, Algeria. UAR desires close bilateral relations with other Arab states, but no axis. UAR meetings with one or more Arab states for purpose exchange views only.

c. UAR unaware of and did not support Shuqairy announcement plan send PLA volunteers to help Viet Cong. In fact UARG arrested Syrian head of volunteer group in Cairo.

d. Uncertain whether proposed Tricontinent Conference (AALAPSO) will take place in Cairo as scheduled 1968. If it should, UAR will be model of moderation and help US against ChiCom activities.

e. Decision taken settle all outstanding US claims en bloc as was done with Belgian claims.

f. Kamel carrying letter to Secretary from Sadat renewing invitation visit UAR. Also has gift photo of President Nasser for President Johnson.

5. Kamel stressed need for corresponding evidence US desire cooperate with UAR:

a. He was instructed to ask for the sale of $50 million of wheat on CCC credit. USG help with 10% guarantee (i.e., $5 million) from US banks also sought.

b. Foregoing arrangement would ease pressure on UAR to assure meeting immediate food needs. Kamel recognized problems posed by election year and said he clearly expected no public response to UAR PL–480 until late November. Desirable however reassure UARG by secret advance expression intent respond favorably. Kamel convinced if US does not signal intention conclude PL–480 agreement, Soviet Union will provide wheat. Ambassador said only his persuasion prevented UAR acceptance Soviet wheat offer at time Kosygin visit.

c. Kamel said imperative US make Faisal understand wheat issue not plaything. Only then would Faisal abandon hope damaging US–UAR relations and follow path of reason that could permit Yemen settlement.

6. Department officer had impression UAR Ambassador may have been given last chance to bring home bacon, despite skepticism at home about probable success his efforts. Kamel made point of suggesting you inform Deputy PriMin Fawzi, FonMin Riad, and Presidential Adviser al-Kholi that he made detailed expose to Department officer upon arrival, hopes to see Assistant Secretary Hare and White House Special Assistant Rostow week June 27 and Secretary upon return from trip to Far East July 9.

7. Department officer conveyed gist Deptel 6653² to Kamel and summarized report your meeting with Kaissouni (Embtel 3267).³ He also cautioned against expecting US officials be impressed by actions taken by UARG (e.g., Pan American and Shell) which dictated primarily by Egyptian economic imperatives. Constructive attitude toward Yemen and South Arabia and demonstrable progress toward improving area stability might brighten prospects future US–UAR cooperation.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London.
2. Document 303.
3. Battle reported in telegram 3267 from Cairo, June 23, that he met with Kaissouni and explained the U.S. response to his March request for a new $150 million P.L. 480 agreement. He observed that the session had gone quite smoothly and commented, “We, in fact, puzzled by low key reaction and lack of effort pressure US for immediate favorable decision.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR)