Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

300. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 16, 1966, 5:50 p.m.

Dave Bell, George Ball and Charles Schultze recommend we go ahead with this year’s budget support grant ($21.4 million) for Jordan. None of us likes budget support, but there is a clear political case for keeping Israel’s longest and most vulnerable flank out of Nasser’s hands.

We have succeeded in getting out of straight budget support everywhere except in Vietnam ($500 million), Korea (steadily falling but still $50 million in FY 67 plans), Laos ($20 million) and Jordan. But in each case there’s important political justification. In Jordan, an 8% annual growth rate raises hopes that Jordan is moving toward ability to pay its own way.

As you told Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in February, we would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical Arabs off Israel’s softest flank.

So far our policy has worked. Hussein resisted heavy Arab pressure to take MIG’s. He has privately agreed to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan where Israel would be hard-pressed to defend. He has squelched fanatical Arabs raiding across Israel’s borders. He has resisted heavy pressure from his military—whose support keeps him in power—to retaliate when Israel has attacked Jordanian villages harboring those raiders.

Secretary Fowler does not approve this grant because of the balance of payments drain (50% is not tied to US procurement). I recommend you read Charlie Schultze’s excellent memo (attached),² which spells out the compromise he has negotiated with Bell. This is the best he feels we can do to meet Secretary Fowler’s legitimate concerns.

I recommend you approve the Bell/Ball/Schultze program. We will continue reducing the payments drain, but cutting back too quickly would undermine Hussein. The kind of deal we have with him may be cheap at the price. Few other events would be as likely to tempt a pre-emptive Israeli attack and trigger a major Mid-East fracas as the threat of a Nasserist takeover in Jordan. We cannot afford to get caught in a mess like that, especially while we are pushing ahead in Vietnam.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret.
2. A copy of Schultze’s June 14 memorandum, along with copies of Ball’s June 10 memorandum and Bell’s May 14 memorandum, are attached to a copy of Rostow’s memorandum, ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 6.