Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, April 27, 1966, 1433Z.

1055. Re Amman’s 651 to Department.² From Adams.³

1. Following is summary of conversation had by Assistant Secretary Hare in Amman morning April 25 with King Hussein with Prime Minister Tell present, as approved by Hare in Beirut.

2. Tone of conversation much smoother, less abrasive than Hare’s conversation 25th with Prime Minister and Court Minister reported reftel, but nonetheless firm. King set tone early in talk by expressing appreciation both for US approval supersonics package, which he understood had been most difficult for USG, and for economic aid. On latter he also expressed understanding difficulties but sincerely hoped there could be appreciable step-up in rate of loan approvals by USG in order keep steam behind Jordan’s economic development.

3. Balance discussion devoted largely King’s appreciation Jordan’s external security position, the Communist threat in area, his dissatisfaction with US policy toward Nasser, and his desire achieve arrangement with USG for continuing evaluation developments in Middle East combined with some degree advance contingency planning.

4. Ambassador Hare employed discussion of aircraft, reported separately, convey to Hussein his feeling derived from discussion Eshkol and others⁴ that Israelis more relaxed re Arab military threat than on previous occasions and his distinct impression Israelis in mood keep things quiet on border. There was, however, no direct reference during conversation to recent border incidents.

5. Discussing external threat Hussein expressed principal concern at possible Communist take-over in Syria saying Jordan could not tolerate such situation. He concerned by present trend that direction, thought Syrian situation would get worse before better but doubted Nasser had substantial assets there. Nasser, however, might try obtain US acquiescence to effort reestablish UAR with Syria. Listing friends on whom Jordan could count King mentioned Iran and SAG. He thought conditions Iraq somewhat improved and agreed Lebanon friendly. Kuwait and Gulf area were open to extremists.

6. Asked by Hare if they discerned any new pattern to Communist approach in Middle East Hussein and PriMin both agreed Communists had abandoned open, “united front” approach and were infiltrating poison directly into various groups, increasing number of which had adopted Marxist dogma and phraseology. Soviets according to Hussein are building a presence in Jordan and neighboring countries, largely through aid.

7. With Nasser Hussein said he expects deterioration in relations and he trying stabilize home base in anticipation Nasser storms. He thought Nasser would probably try get out of Arab Summit meetings, although he (Hussein) would try save them. Nasser, he said, must get out of Yemen. Replying to implied criticism US approach to Nasser Ambassador Hare asserted Nasser not a chosen US instrument, that USG had no illusion about Nasser and many decisions taken in face grave misgivings but in light USG interpretation its best interests.

8. In context threat of Syria and Nasser, Hussein said Jordan would do best resist through own strength but Jordan not an island and must work with friends. In obvious allusion US he asked whether Jordan’s friends have a policy or do they approach Jordan only in terms Arab-Israel dispute.

9. Pursuing this theme Hussein and PriMin urged USG consider collaborating with GOJ in continuing assessment situation in Middle East directed toward preventing Communist take-over through some degree advance contingency planning. Carefully avoiding any implication favorable USG response such proposal, Hare pointed to nebulous nature contingencies and difficulty being precise about circumstances which would involve commitment. Major danger, he said, would lie in taking action in situation which seemed within commitment but which in actual fact was not of type envisaged. Past instances when Syria “lost” was case in point. However,USG would be prepared keep in very close touch on problem. PriMin urged us consider problem “with certain sense of urgency” since situation in Syria or elsewhere in Middle East could blow up at any time.

11. Summary: King Hussein and Prime Minister obviously hope that as result this conversation and that reported reftel, US will: 1) step up approval development loan agreements, 2) re-examine what GOJ regards as US support of Nasser, and 3) seriously and urgently consider possibility continuing review with GOJ of Middle East developments directed toward some degree contingency planning.⁵

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN–US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.
2. Telegram 651 from Amman, April 25, reported a conversation on April 24 between Hare and Prime Minister Tell. The latter complained about delays in U.S. aid, criticized U.S. policy toward Nasser, and appealed for U.S.-Jordan cooperation for a joint assessment of the Middle East scene in order to anticipate and prevent unfavorable developments. (Ibid.) Hare visited Amman in the course of a trip to a number of Near East capitals, including Tel Aviv, Beirut, and Cairo.
3. J. Wesley Adams, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Amman, was Charge in Amman after Barnes relinquished charge of the Embassy on April 23.
4. Memoranda of Hare’s April 24 conversation with Eshkol are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR, POL ARAB–US, and POL ISR–US.
5. Adams reported in telegram 695 from Amman, May 12, that he informed King Hussein the previous day that the U.S. Government had concluded this would not be in the interest of either government. (Ibid., POL JORDAN–US)