Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, March 24, 1966, 3:46 p.m.

5349. 1. Following summary uncleared, FYI,Noforn, and subject to revision upon review memcon.

2. UAR Ambassador Kamel met with Secretary March 22 prior to departure leave in UAR. Reviewed major issues affecting US–UAR relations.

3. Secretary said he wished raise troublesome issue that elicited Congressional interest, namely, activity UAR delegation at Tri-Continent Conference Havana and invitation next Conference convene Cairo. Conference statements on forcible subversion Latin American governments had irritated these governments and precipitated meeting OAS. US desired and compelled maintain solidarity with Latin American neighbors.UAR involvement this conference painful matter.

4. Kamel said while conference non-governmental he understood US sensitivity. He undertook raise matter with President Nasser and Prime Minister Muhyadin. Secretary suggested UARG might possibly dissociate itself from conference in press statement.

5. Kamel make lengthy presentation covering:

a. Improved US–UAR relations justification for expanded economic cooperation.

1) Both Nasser and Sadat expressed desire improve relations with US.

2) Over past months marked improvement tone UAR press.

3) Sadat visit outstandingly successful and offered opportunity that should be exploited.

4) Need to encourage flow of prominent visitors from business and economic fields to UAR.

5) Nasser welcomed US capital investment in fields land reclamation, fertilizer production, port development.

6) Deputy Prime Minister Kaissouni had said UAR willing permit 51 per cent US ownership in enterprises operating in UAR.

7) Nasser had indicated clear desire leave Yemen with honor (reported separate telegram).

8) UAR now requested US consider new PL–480 agreement, value $150 million, duration one year. Ambassador said conclusion such agreement would encourage pro-Western trend in UAR. He hoped agonizing efforts required conclude last agreement would not be repeated.

9) UAR hoped for US encouragement IBRD participate in UAR economic development.

10) UAR anxious for suggestions on how to attract US capital.

11) UAR wished facilitate visit by Congressional group and US businessman group to encourage private capital investment in UAR.

b. Despite foregoing UAR had impression US procrastinating on economic cooperation. Nasser had gone far to meet US desires and would find himself exposed politically if US did not meet him part way. Failure US provide necessary encouragement pro-Western elements could precipitate involuntary reliance on USSR.

c. Arab/Israel issue quiescent. No positive progress, but freezing of issue prevented deterioration. UAR public speeches for domestic consumption of minor significance.

d. UAR willing accept US lead on controlling nuclear proliferation. UAR much concerned by intelligence reports that Israel working toward production nuclear weapons. Kamel referred to Shepilov proposal for NE nuclear control (circa 1959), refused by US.

e. Re Near East arms race, Kamel said on instructions improved US–UAR relations would lessen urgency UAR arms acquisition. Whatever arms UAR acquired, purpose not militant, not for aggression. Arms needed solely for defense, as in case tripartite invasion 1956.

6. Secretary said he wished send greetings and picture President Johnson to President Nasser. Secretary sent personal greetings to Prime Minister Muhyadin, Speaker Sadat and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi. In response subjects raised by Kamel, Secretary said:

a. Unlikely Congressional group could visit UAR before adjournment Congress perhaps June or July. Meanwhile would be in touch with Congressional leaders.

b. Hoped convey data proposed visit to UAR within few days. Possibility brief stop Cairo on way to or from CENTO Conference April 20–21.²

c. Much interested and appreciative forthcoming statement by Nasser on area denuclearization. So far little cooperation from Soviet Union which tried draw in Turkey and Greece although part of NATO alliance. We would follow up.

d. US anxious avoid involvement arms issues in Near East but sometimes drawn in, e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Such involvement complicated US relations but need meet legitimate defense requirements and maintain reasonable balance and security in area made involvement disagreeable necessity. Perhaps steady removal sources fear and suspicion offered means improve situation. US had no wish be major arms supplier. US unhappy at diversion economic resources to military ends.

e. Economic cooperation:

1) US remains interested in UAR and its people. We pleased hear about additional steps taken by UAR to attract private investment. This channel permits bringing resources to bear without complication government budgeting. Channel effective and desirable politically. Possible we might help encourage business leaders visit Cairo as means developing momentum economic progress. Advantages participation international economic organizations also clear.

2) Food will be major issue in next decade. If all countries expanded food production to utmost, barely possible meet world food needs. US moving away from position surplus food producer. This last year US will have surplus resulting from domestic policy. In future planned production necessary meet domestic and foreign commercial needs. This situation requires new element discipline on all sides. Need for hard-headed decisions based on projection food production next decade. US itself could not meet world needs even if extra 60 million acres brought into production.

3) Bilateral aspect economic cooperation complicated by US political system. President needed help in dealing with turbulent US domestic politics. No official answer to UAR PL–480 request possible at this time. Politically two six-month agreements twice as easy to conclude as one one-year agreement. Kamel repeated desirability one-year program stressing need strengthen Nasser’s hand in resisting Soviet pressure. Kosygin may visit Cairo May or June. Also emphasized need avoid any gap after termination present agreement June 30.

7. In conclusion Kamel requested Secretary’s personal support for reactivation grain silo project and help in expansion UAR fertilizer production. Secretary responded with inquiry about estimates of losses to UAR from lack of grain storage facilities. Department officer estimated value losses might pay for cost silo project within three-four years.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 23, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare.
2. Sadat had invited Rusk to visit the United Arab Republic. (Memorandum from Hare to Rusk, March 18; ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) Telegram 937 to Ankara, April 12, stated that due to the exigencies of Vietnam, Rusk planned to reduce the time incidental to his attendance at the CENTO conference to a minimum, precluding his acceptance of invitations to visit Istanbul, Tehran, Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)