Office of the Historian

279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

Washington, March 9, 1966, 12:47 p.m.

1709. 1. Moroccan Ambassador called on Secretary March 7 and inquired about arms situation in Near East. Expressed particular interest in facts behind recent stories of US deliveries to Israel, explaining his Government wished exert traditional moderating influence during forthcoming Cairo FonMin meeting.

2. Secretary reviewed US Near East arms policy as set forth Department’s February 5 press statement2 and correspondence to interested Congressmen (CFR No. 6 February 9).3 In particular made following points: (1) USG did not wish become major arms supplier to area; (2) large-scale Soviet deliveries had created fears not only on part of Israel but also certain Arab States; (3) in line our interest help friendly states meet defense needs we had agreed supply limited number Patton tanks to Jordan and Israel and ground-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia and Israel; (4) while we did not propose discuss details of deliveries, tanks furnished Jordan and Israel were in very modest amounts when compared to armaments UAR had received; (5) Secretary had proposed at Geneva that efforts be made to slow down arms races not related to East-West issues; (6) maybe Morocco, exercising its moderating influence, could ease not only Israel-Arab difficulties but inter-Arab tensions as well.

3. Rabat. You may use above in addition to Deptel 4654 in conversations with GOM officials, should you consider it appropriate and likely to be helpful.

4. Tripoli and Baida. You may draw from above in conversations with Bishti and his private secretary, noting additional guidance below. [Page 566] With further reference to Embtel 775,5 you should avoid giving impression USG entering into field as supplier arms in major quantities but that it merely reacting, to minimum extent consistent with defensive and replacement needs our friends, to Soviet sales that have amounted to $2 billion over past ten years.

5. All addressees. You may use above as you see fit if appropriate occasion should arise to discuss Near East arms situation with host government, particularly if you believe you can count on receptive attitude. However, we do not seek to stimulate Arab reactions and any such approaches you deem advisable should be handled so as to avoid creating impression USG attempting mount campaign to influence Arab thinking. For this reason posts other than Rabat should not mention Moroccan approach. You should not bring up subject of Israel’s nuclear program. If subject should arise, you may say USG watching situation in area carefully and we have no indication GOI developing nuclear weapons. As we have made clear on number of occasions we are adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in Near East. We believe if all countries in area having nuclear potential were to accept IAEA safeguards, helpful step this direction would have been taken. Meanwhile, any USG cooperation in projects this area involving nuclear energy must be accompanied by such safeguards for those projects.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Officer in Charge of Libyan Affairs Hugh Campbell, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs Matthew J. Looram, and Trevithick, and in draft by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert Chase and Meyers; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Amman, Algiers, Beirut, Baida, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rabat, Tripoli, Kuwait, Tunis, Jidda, Taiz, and Khartoum.↩
  2. The text is in telegram 360 to Amman, February 5. (Ibid.) It is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 512.↩
  3. Reference is to Current Foreign Relations, a classified Department of State publication.↩
  4. Telegram 465 to Rabat, March 2, provided guidance similar to that in circular telegram 1709. It also noted that inter-Arab tensions as well as the Israel-Arab dispute affected the arms situation in the Near East and that Arab public statements calling for the liquidation of Israel contributed to pressure for Israeli defensive arms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 MOR)↩
  5. Telegram 775 from Tripoli, March 5, requested guidance concerning U.S. arms sales to Israel. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR)↩