Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, February 28, 1966, 8:33 p.m.

4851. 1. Following summary based on uncleared memcons FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review.

2. Secretary discussed Near East arms race with President UAR National Assembly Sadat February 25.

a. Said US deeply concerned and had tried not become directly or heavily involved. Believed, however, overall area security better served by absence fear resulting from arms imbalance. Wished make informal comments for UAR consideration.

1) Before Vietnam crisis became acute US and USSR were able by “mutual example” turn arms production curve downward. Vietnam, however, forced heavy additional arms expenditures.

2) Could reciprocal restraint serve flatten Near East arms spiral? If not, difficult foresee sane future for Near East.

b. Sadat feared little could be done about Near East arms race. He reviewed history past ten years including 1) UAR arms acquisitions to guard against Israeli military attacks which repeatedly followed public professions of peaceful intent, 2) violation of 1950 Tripartite Declaration² by Franco-British invasion 1956, and 3) Ben-Gurion statement Sinai integral part Israel. Clearly Israel not to be trusted. Israel now stronger and backed by UK which also untrustworthy. Only assurance for UAR against attack was to be armed to teeth. Small size Israel plus policy encouraging Jewish immigration made expansion inevitable. UAR hated spend scarce foreign exchange on arms, but did not want become nation refugees like Palestine.

c. Secretary asked whether fear Israeli expansion or existence Israel that governed UAR attitude. Sadat said both. Secretary observed if former something might be done, if latter not so sure.

d. Secretary stressed unalterable US commitment oppose proliferation nuclear weapons. Applied world-wide to all countries. Injection nuclear weapons into Near East arms race would cause US react very harshly. Sadat replied UAR felt equal concern and would be forced launch preventive war if Israel acquired bomb. Secretary hoped for effective preventive measures short of war.

e. Secretary confirmed US commitment applied equally to imported or indigenously produced weapons.

f. Secretary assured Sadat Israel under no illusions about US stand on nuclear weapons proliferation. Desired widest possible acceptance IAEA safeguards. Sadat said UAR suspected Israel had turned down US try for safeguard for Dimona. While avoiding detailed reply Secretary said he would not take that as conclusion. Sadat said “very good.”

g. UAR Under Secretary al-Feqi noted UAR had said at Vienna it would accept safeguards. On other hand French had acknowledged to UAR that Israel with France’s help probably could now produce plutonium on its own. Secretary suggested UAR recheck this since he understood Franco-Israeli agreement for nuclear cooperation provided for no leave-behind nuclear materials.

h. Secretary said if USSR were to push idea nuclear free zone in Near East, excluding Turkey, we could see advantages to it.

i. In response Secretary’s hope UAR would give intense thought to arms problem, Sadat assured him UAR would never act, only react. Secretary considered this important assurance, but problem was getting Israel to believe it.

j. Secretary asked Sadat whether he believed US could ever support Israel in attempt expand its territory. Sadat replied yes, he could under possible future circumstances of poor US–UAR relations. Secretary said inconceivable US would ever support Israeli attempt territorial expansion, but appreciated Sadat’s frankness.

k. Secretary described UAR economic reforms as best means achieve respect necessary for UAR play leading international role commensurate its potential. This objective posed no problems for US–UAR relations. Sadat interjected Israel only real problem. Might not be solved this generation, but time had also solved problem 80-year Crusader occupation Egypt.

l. Secretary cautioned about US public sensitivity. President Johnson believed deeply leaders of states interested improving relations should not engage in polemics. Secretary assured Sadat President Johnson would not allow him make speeches attacking President Nasser. Sadat smiling said he understood.

3. UAR Ambassador Kamel reporting foregoing to Cairo as well as other Sadat conversations with senior US officials.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare.
2. The text of the Tripartite Declaration, a statement issued by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886, and in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, Vol. II, p. 2237.