Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

274. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 23, 1966, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-U.A.R. Relations; Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly
• His Excellency Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the U.A.R.
• His Excellency Ahmad Hassan al-Feqi, Under Secretary, U.A.R. Foreign Ministry
• The President
• Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Michael Sterner, Escort Officer

In reply to the President’s warm greeting, Sadat expressed his deep appreciation for the reception he had received from all quarters since his arrival. He said he had a message from President Nasser to President Johnson which he wished to read. (Text attached.)²

The President thanked Mr. Sadat for President Nasser’s message and promised that he would send an appropriate reply. The President said he had been encouraged by indication of a more mature understanding of the problems between our two countries. A lot of these difficulties were public relations problems. The President said he knew some of the public relations problems that Mr. Sadat’s government faced. By the same token he hoped the leaders of the U.A.R. could occasionally put themselves in his shoes. He was in a goldfish bowl being watched by 200 million people. That was the character of American democracy. He was now asking Congress to provide him with the wherewithal for a foreign aid program which he considered very important. He hoped Mr. Sadat would appreciate that he wouldn’t stand much of a chance getting that money if he started calling Congressmen names at the very time he was urging them to pass the bill. The President thought the foreign aid bill would pass, but it would take a lot of trouble. By all rights the President thought U.S.-U.A.R. relations should be of the best. The U.S. has contributed more than $1 billion of aid to the U.A.R. over the years. We wouldn’t have given the U.A.R. that much money if we hadn’t been deeply interested in the welfare and security of that country. Yet in spite of this there were bad moments between us. Differences were perhaps inevitable in the affairs of two independent countries, but they didn’t have to be compounded by public relations problems. Whatever difficulties we faced the President hoped they could be discussed quietly among ourselves and not announced to the public over loudspeakers. The President said he faced many public relations problems within the U.S. itself. People were always saying hard things about him and always hoping he would react, but he rarely gave them that pleasure. The President expressed his admiration and personal liking for Ambassador Kamel. “When your government has something to say to us, you just tell Ambassador Kamel to put on his hat and come on down here. Let’s not talk about it in public.”

The President said he wished to comment on a few specific aspects of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He was most appreciative of the U.A.R.’s efforts to be helpful on Vietnam. He had had a first-hand report about this from Governor Harriman.³ He wanted Mr. Sadat’s government to understand exactly what our position was there. We wanted peace, but we weren’t going to allow the other side to take over South Vietnam.

We were not as alarmist as the Egyptians on the subject of possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel. We were watching the situation closely. The U.S. would be against such a development because of our firm policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We hoped there was still a chance for a settlement in Yemen. We had been sorry to see that recently there was some slowdown in the progress that was being made last summer. Couldn’t both the Egyptians and Saudis get together and talk about their difficulties? Ambassador Hare said we had been urging just this on both the Egyptians and Saudis for some time. The President asked Ambassador Hare to look into anything further the U.S.G. could do along these lines.

President Johnson said that the U.S.G. was impressed by the self-help measures the U.A.R. Government had recently adopted. We hoped this trend would continue.

In summary, the President said we thought there was a sound basis for excellent relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. The U.A.R. could depend on the U.S. doing its part. He repeated that he personally was grateful for the U.A.R.’s good offices on Vietnam and asked that Mr. Sadat convey his very best regards to President Nasser.

Mr. Sadat said, first of all, he wished to express the gratitude of his government and his nation for all the help the U.S. had given the U.A.R. More than this, Egyptians were grateful for the special attention President Johnson had personally given to U.S.-U.A.R. relations during periods when he had many other things on his mind. One problem seemed to be worrisome for the U.A.R.G. at the moment—Yemen. Following the Jidda Agreement last year,⁴ Nasser had declared that the U.A.R. wanted nothing further out of Yemen and that it was ready to evacuate its forces. Unfortunately, the U.A.R. had been running into some misinterpretations of the Jidda Agreement on the Saudi side. Both before and after the Haradh Conference President Nasser had asked to meet with King Faisal to sort out these differing views. These offers had been evaded with polite rejections. In Mr. Sadat’s opinion, Faisal apparently thought the U.A.R. was desperate and “begging for peace” in Yemen. Mr. Sadat wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. The U.A.R. was not begging for peace. But it was ready to make every reasonable effort to arrive at a peace that would be honorable for both sides. The U.A.R. could not get out of Yemen without leaving behind some form of viable government. This was what the U.A.R. wanted to talk about with Faisal but in view of his unwillingness to talk the U.A.R. frankly did not know what more it could do. The President asked whether another Nasser-Faisal meeting of the type they had last summer was out of the question. Mr. Sadat indicated this was exactly what his government was trying to bring about.

President Johnson repeated his desire for good relations with the U.A.R. as well as his hopes that differences between the two countries could be kept out of the public forum. On the present meeting, he hoped they could just leave it that “mutual problems” had been discussed without any mention of specifics. Both Mr. Sadat and Ambassador Kamel indicated their agreement.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 24 and approved in the White House on March 1. The meeting was held at the White House.
2. The text of the message, undated, is attached but not printed. It introduced Sadat and observed that his visit came at a time of “marked improvement” in U.S.-UAR relations, of which the recent economic agreement was an example.
3. Harriman met with Nasser in Cairo on January 4 in the course of a trip to various capitals for discussions concerning Vietnam. He reported his conversation with Nasser in telegram 1677 from Cairo, January 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV)
4. Reference is to an agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia signed at Jidda, August 24, 1965. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 623–624.