Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Arab/Israeli Arms Supply

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I lunched with the Soviet Ambassador today at his invitation. In the course of the conversation, I said that as he probably knew, the United States had followed a policy of not becoming a major supplier of arms to Israel and the Arab countries. I said, however, that we were under constant pressure to furnish or sell arms to the countries of this area and I said that speaking quite frankly the Soviet supply of arms, particularly to the UAR, added to our problem. I said I supposed it was impossible to shut off the sale of arms completely to any area in the world, but we had been wondering, in our Government, whether or not it would be possible to at least hold down the arms race in the Middle East by some understanding between the arms supplying countries to limit the sale of arms on a qualitative basis. I suggested, for example, that it might be possible to agree not to sell supersonic planes or rockets to the countries of this area. I said I thought that the Secretary had raised this matter with Mr. Gromyko last autumn.

Dobrynin said that he recalled this conversation but that not much had come of it. On the question of rockets, he said he understood that we had furnished some Hawk missiles to Israel or to some other country in the area. I said I was not sure, but thought this was possible. However, I pointed out that I was thinking of surface-to-surface missiles and not surface-to-air.

Dobrynin asked if I had intended that he take this matter up with his Government. I said I did and that what I was saying was a very informal probe to see whether or not there was any interest on the part of the Soviet Union. Dobrynin asked what about other countries and inquired specifically if we had discussed this with the French or British. I said that I did not think there had been any specific discussion, although our general position on the sale of arms was well known. I said I thought that there was little point in pursuing it with other governments unless the Soviet Union was interested, but that if such an arrangement were worked out, it would have to cover the principal suppliers of arms. I thought that if the more important countries agreed, there would be little difficulty with smaller countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland.

Dobrynin said that he would inform his Government.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 UAR. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 17. A February 14 memorandum from Komer to the President requested his approval for a low-key probe to see if the Soviets were interested in a freeze on arms shipments to the Middle East. The memorandum states that Rusk proposed this as part of the Israel-Jordan aircraft package and that none of the President’s advisers thought the Soviets would be receptive but thought it would be useful for the record. Johnson approved. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20)