233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
517. As the UAR’s economic situation remains difficult as result its foreign exchange position, our staunchest friends here (such as [Page 490] Kaissouny) are urging us strongly give some early indication that new food agreement of some size will be possible by end of year, assuming no major additional irritants in our relations. They specifically urge that we do so before President Nasser departs for Moscow August 27. I assume this timing impossible in view current status aid legislation and climate Congressional opinion, but we must give UAR some fairly definite sign of our intentions by early October because it must begin then to plan for additional wheat supplies needed in January.
An affirmative decision will not guarantee a new honeymoon in US–UAR relations. It would be an important step however in rebuilding our influence to the levels enjoyed in 1962–63 and in protecting our essential interests in the area. We would envisage a series of short term agreements for specific products beginning with tobacco. Wheat in particular I would limit to amounts to be augmented by later agreements in the light of prevailing relationships realistically appraised.
If our decision is negative or we continue to be evasive for many more months, I am convinced we can expect progressive and fairly rapid decline in our position here and substantial harm to some of our interests elsewhere in area. I would expect the Embassy’s effectiveness to be reduced to roughly that of British at present, i.e., little useful contact with UAR authorities and little or no influence on such matters as UAR policies on Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula or Libya.
We have much to lose here in terms of a position of influence. We should take hard look at realities of situation before permitting further decline in Western influence at a critical time in this area.
In view importance decisions involved, believe I should return on consultation at a time when Dept thinks my presence in Washington would be most useful in reassessing and redefining US policy towards UAR. As noted above, decision should be reached by early October and as far as local factors concerned mid-September would appear most suitable time for consultation.2
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 8:20 a.m.↩
- Telegram 1126 to Cairo, August 20, authorized Battle to plan to return for consultations in mid-September. It stated that the Department was not prepared to give the UAR Government a commitment on a new P.L. 480 agreement at that time and that it envisaged a meeting between Battle and Nasser after his consultations to explore areas of possible improvement in U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid.)↩