Office of the Historian

231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

Washington, July 30, 1965, 8:06 p.m.

91. Embtel 75.2 President keenly disappointed in Primin’s reply to his letter on May 21 on IAEA safeguards. You should seek appointment with PriMin soonest after Thursday July 29 (date for signing supplementary tank agreement) to convey President’s disappointment. As stated in presidential letter, we are aware Primin’s problems with forthcoming parliamentary elections and are therefore willing refrain from insistence now on commitment. In our view special relationship between US and Israel and friendship between Primin and President provide basis for greater reassurance than appeared in letter. We are so confident Primin’s showing in elections we would be satisfied at this juncture with his assurance if he remains in office following November elections he will do all he can to advance acceptance by GOI of IAEA safeguards for all Israeli reactors. Without such assurance we fear shadow creeping over our relationships while we wait for GOI reply. He should understand USG and US people feel deeply about non-proliferation and this could become point of issue between us later if no progress made.3

At same meeting but without overt linkage to foregoing you should tactfully inform Primin that while we are pleased at the successful conclusion of the tank arrangements, he should be aware, however, that we continue adhere to our position against use of force by Israel against its neighbors. Military strikes by Israel against its neighbors would force us reconsider proceeding with the deliveries. You should note Talbot has made similar point to Ambassador Harman and Mr. [Page 485] Dinstein at July 29 signing of supplement to the November 15, 1964, tank agreement.4

FYI: Uncertainty over tank negotiations may have served as deterrent to Israel’s carrying out its threats to strike militarily at Lebanon’s water diversion activities. By threatening to make continued deliveries contingent on no preemptive strikes we hope continue keep Israel in line. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AE 11–2 ISR. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Anton N. Nyerges; cleared by Talbot, Spain, Scoville, Komer, Symmes, Thomas, Colonel Haynes in DOD, and Wolle; and approved and initialed by Rusk.↩
  2. Telegram 75 from Tel Aviv, July 26, transmitted the text of Eshkol’s reply to Johnson’s May 21 letter. Eshkol’s letter stated that Israel’s position on any subject related to its security was necessarily influenced by the unabated hostility of its neighbors and suggested deferring discussion of the matter until after the Israeli election. The telegram reported that Barbour expressed regret at the reply and stressed the importance that President Johnson attached to the problem. Eshkol called attention to a recent statement by UAR Vice President Amer referring to plans for development of nonconventional weapons. (Ibid.) The letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Prime Minister Eshkol Correspondence.↩
  3. Barbour reported in telegram 116 from Tel Aviv, August 10, that he told Eshkol of the President’s disappointment. (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV)↩
  4. Barbour reported in telegram 127 from Tel Aviv, August 13, that he did not make this point on August 10 but sent word to Eshkol that Talbot’s July 29 remark was not an off-hand aside but represented a determined U.S. Government position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–LEB)↩