Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, July 26, 1965, 3:30 p.m.

600. Following summary based on uncleared Memcon and subject to revision on review. FYI only and Noforn.

Secretary July 26 gave UAR Ambassador Kamel initial reaction to UAR request for new PL–480 agreement.² He said:

1) Our problem still one of public atmosphere and timing. We judged present UAR procurement arrangements allowed some time. With aid bill before Congress we in difficult position these coming weeks. Until bill passed discussion proposed agreement sensitive.

2) Suggest quiet talks in Cairo to deal with unresolved technical aid matters. We cannot now engage in talks that might be interpreted as negotiations new PL–480 agreement, however.

3) Hope meanwhile conduct U.S.-U.A.R. relations in low key, get them off front pages and into diplomatic channels.

Ambassador undertook convey Secretary’s views to Nasser. He stressed response to Nasser’s request for wheat vital since he going to Moscow next month. Important give Nasser impression US will seriously consider try make agreement.

Secretary said he could not give such categoric answer. Reference in Nasser’s July 22 speech³ tying US supply of food to US “pressures” not helpful. Actually PL–480 agreement and talks on Near East arms limitation unrelated. Apart from problems arising from reservations here that large UAR arms build up impaired effectiveness aid as stimulus to economic development, best avoid public debate.

Kamel said he thought Nasser’s motive in citing US pressure was to underline vital Egyptian interest in wheat. Crux is if US does not supply food others will. Egypt has maintained non-aligned policy thus far, but failure obtain US wheat would expose it to Communist domination. Important that President understand that seriousness situation comparable to 1955 Aswan dam decision. UAR Ambassador at that time criticized for not having given adequate warning dangers involved; Kamel wished avoid similar mistake and clear his conscience toward Secretary, history and world. Question not of wheat, but US relations with Egypt, Near East and perhaps Africa.

Secretary agreed consequences could be serious, but if UAR wished go to other side, little we could do to stop it. UAR should not underestimate US constitutional system and need to build coalitions of popular support behind each governmental policy. We committed consult with Congress on new agreement and impressions from Cairo important in shaping Congressional attitudes. Speech by Nasser thanking Soviet Union for wheat, but failing mention $400 million worth US wheat sales inevitably caused adverse domestic effect.

Secretary hoped, if matters kept quiet, it would be possible work out another agreement. Important that both Cairo and Washington understand elements that make action possible.

Later Ambassador Kamel expressed satisfaction to Dept officer about results meeting. He said, however:

1) Important remove fear of famine from Nasser’s mind. UAR must have food; would prefer US as supplier, but will go anywhere to get it.

2) Since suspension PL–480 sales last January, UAR officials puzzled and perplexed by US attitude conducting agonizing reappraisal US–UAR relations.

3) Important maintain and even accelerate tempo contacts with UAR officials during coming weeks to forestall rash acceptance possible Communist wheat arrangement. Detente might lead to discouragement.

4) Effort to improve climate US–UAR relations must be joint endeavor along broad front in both Cairo and Washington. Control of US secret activities not in best interests UAR important contribution. Many Egyptians feel UAR position in Arab World being undermined.

5) While Nasser aware of domestic problems USG faces in formulation foreign policy, he does not understand them and believes President capable fully controlling domestic pressures. He suspects US reluctance move on wheat may be plot to exploit vital UAR need as means embarrass and overthrow him. Should he become convinced validity his suspicions he would react violently and irrationally regardless of consequences.

Foregoing given in strict confidence with injunction source remain undisclosed.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Talbot.
2. Kamel conveyed the official UAR request in a July 7 call on Secretary Rusk. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid., POL UAR-US)
3. Nasser’s July 22 speech is summarized in a memorandum of that date from Read to the Secretary. (Ibid., POL 15–1 UAR) Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 619–620.