Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:22 p.m.

58. Assistant Secretary Talbot July 19 gave Israel Ambassador Harman reply to Israel Embassy’s formal demarche of July 7 on Lebanese diversion plans.² Talbot stated our estimate Lebanese work proceeding slowly, as GOL had informed us. Question of Lebanese deceiving us has not arisen since they never said they would stop, only that they would drag their feet. If we should now perceive any unusual activity, we would consider what extraordinary efforts we should make. Meanwhile we will continue express our concern to GOL. Israel should convey its concern through ILMAC which would be an appropriate and effective channel. Talbot noted recent public statement by Israel COS Rabin had reduced GOL flexibility and made it more difficult for us to exercise our influence. Harman specifically inquired at what level we would be making demarches to GOL. Talbot replied it might be at more than one level, normal contact with senior level of GOL being our Ambassador.

Harman emphasized Israelis do not believe what GOL doing is foot-dragging. Israel Minister Gazit reviewed Israeli position stating GOI had refuted US deprecation of Lebanese project by indicating both Lebanese and Syrian sections of canal are on same contour and excavations near al-Meri are for larger enterprise than mere roadshifting. He reiterated now is right time from diplomatic point of view to push Lebanese into removing tractors, slow foot-dragging down to standstill and create right atmosphere for gradual shelving entire plan. Harman stated there had been predisposition in GOI to minimize Lebanese project while watching Syrians most closely. However GOL, even after Nasser speech of May 31 and for reasons Israel cannot fathom, continued at increased pace when it had excuse to stop. Now Jerusalem is no longer predisposed minimize it.

Harman concluded that, while he would report Talbot’s suggestion of continued use of ILMAC channel for this purpose, GOI would still be appreciative of US demarche to Lebanese stressing new element in Israeli concern over situation. Talbot replied we would keep eye on situation and might have further conversation on it.

You should seek meeting with Eshkol to speak along following lines:

1. We, as friends of Israel, are concerned at certain recent Israeli actions vis-a-vis Arabs. We would have expected, during recent months as high tide of Arab Summit solidarity receded and as Arab realists recognized once again Israel’s basic military preeminence, that GOI actions would be characterized more consistently by calm, confidence and restraint expected of nation whose security is essentially, if not absolutely, assured. However we have noted GOI on several occasions past six weeks has acted as if its existence was in immediate jeopardy. GOI reaction late May to alleged Fatah raids was out of proportion to damage those raids and appears to us ill-advised in that target nation was one that seemed to be working curb terrorist activities. Erection of large burlap screen on border by Israeli forces in Jerusalem early July aroused fears and suspicions unnecessarily. Finally GOI reaction to Lebanese canal digging has in our view gone beyond justifiable requirements.

2. Appears to us Israel may be losing opportunities inherent in present Arab disarray. In current phase through which Arab world passing there may be real opportunities make large strides toward peace and stability in Near East. We hope Israelis will look beyond immediate desiderata (e.g. desire achieve final collapse of presently feeble Arab water diversion efforts) to longer-range goals of finding necessary pre-conditions for peace or long-term modus vivendi in area.

3. GOI actions pointed to above also have disadvantages in our view of detracting from Israel’s image as country sincerely devoted to peace with its neighbors and of making USG efforts to help Israel more difficult and reducing their chances of success.³

4. We will, of course, as indicated to Ambassador Harman, continue express our concern to Lebanese over pace of their diversion activities at this juncture. We will continue keep watchful eye on that situation and anticipate further conversations with GOI officials on it.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Kinsolving, cleared by Symmes and in substance by Campbell, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Paris, and pouched to Jerusalem.
2. Reference is to a conversation between Gazit and Rusk, during which Gazit raised the subject of Israeli concern about continuing Lebanese canal construction and stated that the Israelis thought the situation required an immediate high-level demarche urging the Lebanese to discontinue further construction. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid.) A memorandum of Talbot’s conversation with Harman is ibid.
3. Barbour reported in telegram 77 from Tel Aviv, July 26, that he discussed the subject with Eshkol that morning. (Ibid.)
4. The approaches to Eshkol and Helou were approved by Rusk. (Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, July 14; ibid.) Telegram 64 to Beirut, July 17, instructed Porter to discuss Israel’s concern with President Helou. (Ibid.) Porter reported in telegram 69 from Beirut, July 20 that in a meeting with Helou the day before, the latter assured him that there was no cause for Israeli concern. (Ibid.)