220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

2380. Following is uncleared memcon FYI Noforn.2 Secretary called in Israel Ambassador May 28 to express deep concern over Israeli military raids into Jordan territory May 27–28. He said USG took serious view such activities on peaceful frontier. Timing raids during meeting Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo made situation even more explosive. [Page 467] USG had hoped that in view its clearly expressed opposition to use of force such activities would not occur.

Ambassador Harman explained attacks not on Jordan but on bases of Fatah organization which since January had been conducting raids against civilian targets in Israel. Ambassador reviewed number such incidents including 1) February 27 attack on Kfar Hess which gave rise to Israel’s letter to Security Council; 2) March 4 incident along Negev border which UNTSO investigation indicated was work of organized group for which Jordan responsible; and 3) Recent increase in sabotage during May culminating in Ramat Hakovesh and Afula attacks.

Israeli attack aimed at three places: 1) Shuneh where training base and arms cache of Fatah destroyed, 2) Qalqiliya which jump-off point for attacks on Kfar Hess and Ramat Hakovesh, and 3) Jenin from which Afula attack mounted. Ambassador stressed need for Jordanian responsibility for activities within its borders and attacks emanating from within Jordan. Israel had exhibited patience when sabotage caused no casualties but attacks on inhabited areas intolerable. Ambassador hoped Jordan would derive lesson from raids and take more serious view regarding need control Fatah.

Secretary noted: 1) incident at Qalqiliya involved not just pinpoint sabotage but sustained artillery fire; 2) some question regarding what occurred at Afula since GOI apparently blocking further investigation incident; facts available cast doubt upon Jordanian responsibility for incident; and 3) Jordan had said it would concert with Arab nations for joint action in retaliation to Israeli attacks. This could lead to serious situation. Secretary requested resume of Fatah incidents with indication those reported to UN.3 He urged Israel do everything to restore calm and not permit escalation of military activity. While Israeli contention that Jordan responsible activities individuals within its territory valid as general proposition, sovereign governments cannot always guarantee behavior individuals.

Ambassador said Israel anxious avoid military escalation but believed that interest area stability served by making Jordan aware of its responsibilities.

Secretary concluded with reference to having instructed our Ambassador to make parallel approach in Tel Aviv.4

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Campbell, Staff Assistant in EUR George W. Jaeger, and Talbot; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Jerusalem, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Bonn, Rome, and Moscow.
  2. A more detailed memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL 27–14 ISR–JORDAN.
  3. Telegram 1227 to Tel Aviv, May 29, transmitted a list of nine incidents provided by Ambassador Harman. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN)
  4. Instructions were sent in circular telegram 2367, May 28. (Ibid.) Barbour reported in telegram 1533 from Tel Aviv, May 28, that he had discussed with Foreign Ministry Director General Levavi the U.S. view of the raids. (Ibid.) He reported in telegram 1544 from Tel Aviv, May 29, that he had raised the subject with Foreign Minister Meir. (Ibid.)