Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

216. Memorandum for Record¹

Washington, May 20, 1965.

Abe Feinberg called on the President tonight, and the latter asked me right over. Subject was Israeli worries on arms, especially the planes.²

Feinberg’s plaint was that the Israelis were concerned about: (a) our evasiveness on the matter—they couldn’t even get any information; (b) in wigging Harman on the recent unprovoked Israeli pre-emptive attack on Syrian bulldozers, Talbot had said we couldn’t even discuss arms if this sort of thing was going on.³ Harman was most upset over this linking of Israeli behavior and our arms agreement (Rusk had personally told poor Phil to do this), so had poured out his woes to Feinberg.

I explained the circumstances, and how unhappy we were over the Israeli use of strongarm tactics (the Syrians didn’t even fire back). The President backed me up, and asked Feinberg to tell Eshkol we couldn’t accept shooting and killing on the water issues.

On the planes I explained how we frankly doubted that Israel had made much effort to explore European sources first. We had to insist that if Israel could get planes there it should do so. The President was good as gold on this too, telling Feinberg he knew the Israelis wanted “US” planes, but that we weren’t going to come through unless there was no other alternative.

He then told me to give Feinberg all the fill-in he wanted, and to make sure we lived up to our agreement. We were going to be hard bargainers, but we didn’t welsh on any deals. He then explained to Feinberg his worries that he’d ruined Erhard’s chances for re-election. We had a little discussion of the BG/Eshkol squabble (Feinberg thought Eshkol sure to win) and that was that.

I then took Feinberg off and mollified him, explaining some of the reasons for the delays and assuring him that everything was reasonably on the tracks, so long as the Israelis behaved. To give him a little something to say to Eshkol, I told him I thought we could deliver a few tanks before the Israeli election to back Eshkol’s hand. On the planes, however, we were sure there were adequate European types available—probably better than we could provide. If the Israelis were smart they’d stop wasting time trying to probe our availabilities and latch on to the best European deal they could. If they ran into roadblocks they could ask our help. We wouldn’t let State drag its heels too much—but Israel had to play ball too.

Feinberg’s next worry was how he could reassure various groups in US Jewry who were hearing about arms to Jordan and wondered how Israel could be protected. He’d have a big problem here when the 1966 elections rolled around. I told him in spades that secrecy was still the order of the day, although by the time of the 1966 campaign we might be able to take off the wraps a bit.

I taxed Feinberg gently for squawking to the President too quickly, but blamed it on Harman. Feinberg hastened to explain that he hadn’t sought an appointment for this purpose; he was going to Israel so had asked if the President would like to see him first. He’d been invited, and only when he came down today and saw Harman had the latter poured out his woes. Ergo, I shouldn’t tax Harman for having gone around end. Having made my point, I subsided.

RWK

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.
2. On April 19, Gazit gave the Department of State a request for Israeli purchase of tanks, planes, and other military equipment. (Telegram 1075 to Tel Aviv, April 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR)
3. The reference is to a May 19 conversation between Talbot and Harman, in which Harman pressed for a response to Israel’s request for arms purchases. Talbot replied that the response was being formulated but raised the subject of the recent incidents on the Syrian border, noting that the United States opposed the use of force in the water issue and stating that if the evidence clearly showed Israel was involved with military initiatives, it would not be possible to proceed with military talks. (Telegram 1184 to Tel Aviv, May 19; ibid.)