Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, May 7, 1965.

3898. Deptel 6651² raises interesting question which this Embassy has pondered for many months. Do actions and commitments arising from two Arab summit conferences constitute an integrated “plan?” We believe the answer, not surprisingly, is “yes and no.”

Arab summit I was hastily called by Nasser to devise ways and means short of offensive military action to respond to Israel off-take of Tiberias water. Arab summit I succeeded in achieving this objective, but it set other policies and institutions in motion which, up to present, like Topsy have “just growed.” These can be fitted together in some fashion to make up a “plan” but such a “plan” contains several contradictory elements.

Main aspects of Arab summit policies include:

1. Arab counter works on Jordan tributaries. This involves joint financing on Arab territories of engineering works calculated to use water from the Jordan system. Arabs tell us confidentially this will not involve off-take significantly greater than Johnston Plan allocations. Publicly they indicate this will harm Israel economy and Israel offensive action against Arab works on Arab territories must be expected.

2. UAC. To deal with this contingency armed forces of Arab states surrounding Israel must be strengthened and preparations made for back-up military support of other Arab states. Up to present we have no indications that UAC planning other than defensive. But imaginative and wishful-thinking Arabs must be discussing contingencies whereby UAC “defense” has been so effective that it can quickly move to offense. This wishful thinking having fairly wide impact on Arab public opinion.

But we believe sober Arab leadership contemplates Arabs developing sufficient force to create a military stalemate with Israel. Then UN and/or great powers are expected to step into situation and force a settlement on terms favorable to Arabs.

3. Politico-economic preparation. To achieve UN/great power support at critical juncture postulated above, Arab summiteers decided on such steps as stepped up propaganda campaign, visits of Arab delegations to world capitals to “explain” Arab viewpoint, etc. They also made motions of progress toward policies whereby united Arab economic pressure (mostly oil) could be brought to bear on Western countries to bring them around to Arab viewpoint.

4. Palestine liberation. This is where most contradictions occur. Three elements above can be said to form reasonably comprehensive plan. But it became obvious between two Arab summits that Palestinians themselves should be given greater role. As result, “liberation of Palestine” became proclaimed goal, and PLO and PLA were established. Goal of “liberation” simply cannot be reconciled with defensive politico-military-economic strategy outlined above. Results confuse everybody. Ambitious but untrusted Palestine refugee leader Shukairy tries to equate PLO with bodies that liberated Algeria from France. But Arab leaders obviously refuse to go along. While PLO sits as member of Arab summit conference it has been made clear that (unlike PGRA) it is not a “government” and should not be recognized as such by other governments including Arabs. While Palestine “army” has been created, it has no independent life of its own but operates as part of the United Arab Command. Arabs generally seem apprehensive over Shukairy’s direct contacts with Red China, Jordan fears fruition of Shukairy’s ambition would curtail its own sovereignty, UAR miffed at Shukairy’s attempt dominate Arab League over Bourguiba issue.

Foregoing is Arab “plan” as it appears to us after following Arab summitry for nearly eighteen months and many conversations with Egyptians and other Arab officials in Cairo. We do not believe there is more to “plan” than this. Our belief is that “plan’s” basic internal contradictions are in effect the seeds of its own destruction. But, as suggested in last sentence reftel, Embassy will pursue its inquiries in this matter as opportunities arise.

Battle

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 10:38 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.
2. Telegram 6651 to Cairo, April 29, asked if the Arab summit conferences held in Cairo and Alexandria in 1964 had agreed on a “plan” or conditions for solution of the Palestine problem. Department officials had noted references to such a “plan” in a number of Arab responses to recent proposals by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for a Palestine settlement. (Ibid.)