170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1075. Personal for Secretary from Harriman. Your message confirms again the difficulty of communication by telegraph that I have known since my 1920 international banking days. I can assure you that all the points you make have been underscored with Eshkol et al to point of rudeness. Your telegram makes assumptions that should not be read into Eshkol’s words. We are not on notice that Israel intends military action. It wants to avoid such action but it will not give up its sovereign rights on the basis of a general assurance that we will help them get their share of water. Israelis want to know precisely what we are going to do in support of peaceful means. They certainly believe that the threat of military action is something to keep holding over Arabs as an essential in any negotiations.
Eshkol assures me Israel is not flirting with nuclear weapons but they are not willing to commit themselves irrevocably at least until they know Egyptian intentions. Their suspicions are aroused and I could not allay them to point of forever giving up threat they might go nuclear, which they see as of value in deterring Nasser aggression.
They believe Nasser’s threats that he intends to obliterate them if he can. Experience with Hilter’s threats is too recent to be forgotten.
[Page 370]I have told Israelis unmistakably that proposed change in U.S. policy means we will give careful consideration to their residual arms needs “if the general security situation in the Near East requires it.” They have answered and firmly believe that the security situation in the Near East has already deteriorated since last June, even before our proposal to supply tanks and other material to increase Jordan’s military capacity. They ask that we face these facts together now in Jerusalem or in Washington. I am meeting with Eshkol again with Barbour and Komer in Jerusalem this afternoon and I can assure we all will do everything possible to achieve purposes outlined.
We agree impolitic for me to remain longer, but that Komer should stay with Barbour to continue negotiations. As procedural matter, however, he cannot “assist Barbour” when he has just recently been here as private Presidential emissary. Barbour concurs. Their working relationship could not be better.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:33 a.m. and passed to the White House. A typed copy was sent to the President. (Ibid., Harriman Israeli Mission (II))↩