164. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1058. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman.
Part II.
US Response.
I gave Eshkol no encouragement. I said this first we’d heard of B–66 request, and could hardly express any opinion. Eshkol urged that I at least submit to Washington. I agreed, though saying could in no way predict early answer to wholly new proposal which would hit Washington cold on weekend. Meanwhile Jordan matter couldn’t wait.
Komer took up cudgels, reminding Eshkol that at first meeting PriMin had said Israel’s security had priority over his own political problems. Washington insisted. But one thing he would say without hesitation was that, whatever US interim response,USG could not reach decision on such major request quickly nor in any way accept concept of simultaneous publicity. There no point even discussing this. President felt that in proposing basic shift in long-standing US arms policy he had made far-reaching new step toward helping meet Israel’s security needs. In effect, Israelis saying they could not accept US word [Page 357] but must see results too. Perhaps Washington might agree elaborate our offer to include promise consider tank and even plane requests. But one thing certain, US was not going to invite disaster like that Bonn just had with Cairo. Even if USG prepared entertain specific arms requests, Komer certain USG would insist adamantly that timing and nature of disclosure must be fully in US hands. No point in even referring Israeli requests to Washington if simultaneous disclosure with Jordan sales also mandatory.
Eshkol granted security needs more important than political requirements. If USG prepared indicate it willing respond favorably on M–48’s and B–66’s US could decide how matter should be publicized. However Israel must be consulted. He thought he could assure compliance on secrecy. We believe that meeting of minds reached on absolute US requirement for secrecy insofar as possible.
I then insisted only US package proposal could be considered. As President has instructed me, we could not agree even to direct arms sales in principle unless other US conditions met. Will report further on these, but highlights are:
- A.
- Eshkol only willing reiterate existing public commitment “not be first to introduce nuclear weapons into Near East.” He insisted this most he able get through Israeli Cabinet. It politically impossible agree on IAEA controls until all other major potential proliferators do so, not just UAR.
- B.
- Jordan waters problem consumed most time, as in other meetings. Mrs. Meir carried ball. Eshkol willing give secret promise end or “exhaust” all peaceful means solution but unwilling so far have any mention recourse to UN. Israelis also insist US agree to all-out support precise allocations Johnston Plan and “oppose” any Arab deviation. They propose we reserve both UN angle and degree US support of Johnston Plan for later full discussion.
- C.
- As to quiet Israeli support for US arms sales to Jordan, I stressed President Johnson’s political requirement, which he saw as in Israel’s own interest. I made clear Israeli acceptance our needs here indispensable to any agreement. I believe Israelis will accept our position provided other matters settled.
I gave no ground on three issues above, but will submit recommendations later. My comments on key issue of US arms sales follow in Part III.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:12 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD.↩