Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 10 p.m.

1051. From Harriman. Our discussion with Israelis this afternoon took a negative turn.

Eshkol was accompanied by Mrs. Meir, Peres, Levavi, and General Rabin. He read from a memo based, he maintained, on our previous discussions. In fact, however, he included about everything Israel would like to have us committed to, including arms to Israel to counter Soviet supply to Arabs. General Rabin then presented in graphic form present and future Arab-Israel air and tank relative capabilities.

I countered by reading from memo outlining commitments we expect Israel to make in conjunction with US consideration of direct supply arms to Israel as based on my instructions.

After emotional statements by Eshkol and Mrs. Meir and a cooler analysis by Peres, it was agreed that Peres and Levavi should meet with Komer and Barbour this evening, hopefully to arrive at meeting of minds.²

I agreed to meet with Eshkol tomorrow to consider outcome tonight’s session. We will surely be asked to reaffirm assurances to Israel we have already given. In addition, Israelis will probably insist we make more definite commitment supply military equipment than my instructions cover, particularly make-up 90 German tank shortfall plus off-set to growing Arab strengthening of Jordan as well as improved Soviet equipment to UAR.

Possibly we may also be asked for: (a) earlier public statement than we want of US agreement to direct arms supply with consideration of some grants if arms race goes beyond Israel’s means; (b) if peaceful effort fails to control spite diversion Jordan headwaters, our non-intervention with Israeli direct action.

I may have message later tonight requiring reply soonest.

Barbour

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House.
2. Harriman reported in telegram 1052 from Tel Aviv, February 26, that the evening discussion resulted in some agreement but that the participants failed to agree on a satisfactory Israeli assurance to use all peaceful recourse on the water issue or on the manner in which quiet Israeli acquiescence in the Jordan arms sale would be expressed. In addition, although the Israelis agreed to a restatement of nuclear self-denial, they were unwilling to accept IAEA controls. (Ibid.)