Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 13, 1965, 8:28 p.m.

748. For Komer. Tel Aviv’s 971.² At this juncture Hussein would be most reluctant enter into private understanding which if leaked could seriously endanger his position. Additionally, our capability to enforce such an understanding, even if one could be arrived at, would be limited.

In Talbot’s discussions with Hussein and Khammash, it was made clear that Jordan will keep bulk of its modern tanks on East Bank on theory armored force has defensive role only. Believe you can reassure Peres that even with new arms, armored strength West Bank would be increased to small degree if at all. You may also inform him that Jordan intends remove from its inventory around 100 Charioteers and Centurions in 1965–66.

FYI. We do not believe present situation and still doubtful status German deliveries require any decision on our part to make up possible short-fall of 90 tanks. Israel will receive 310 modern tanks in months ahead. Schroeder’s reported demarche to UAR Ambassador Bonn could indicate Germany may complete deliveries if Ulbricht received in Cairo. Until your supplementary instructions received suggest you avoid going beyond saying matter will be considered later in Washington.

We agree it seems significant that at this stage Israelis are limiting their demands on us to the 90 tanks included in German deal. End FYI.³

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/Komer. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball.
2. In telegram 971 from Tel Aviv, February 12, Komer reported his meeting with Peres, who said Eshkol had authorized him to discuss the situation frankly and informally. Peres stressed Israeli concern about the need to preserve Israel’s “depth territorially and balance militarily.” He suggested a private understanding with King Hussein that Jordan would not increase its armored strength on the West Bank or would do so only to a very small degree, and he requested that the United States make up the shortfall of 90 tanks which were to have been provided by Germany. (Ibid.)
3. Komer replied in telegram 973 from Tel Aviv, February 14, that he would again reassure the Israelis along these lines. He commented that the Israelis would not limit their demands to 90 tanks; if the United States stated publicly that it would replace the German tanks, “we’re compromised and have in effect changed our whole arms policy. So let’s not kid ourselves.” (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN)