Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, October 30, 1964, 8:23 p.m.

362. Embtel 401.² We commend your presentation to Eshkol. We believe our ability to continue quiet, low-key approaches with Nasser not only useful but essential if any tacit restraint in arms field is to occur by both sides. Therefore, we hope PM can be convinced that continued efforts to develop more positive influence in Cairo is in our joint interests. You should stress once again necessity for absolute secrecy with regard our discussions.

FYI—We recognize fragility US progress with Nasser on arms issue. It is this very fragility which underlines importance of Israel’s cooperation if USG is to further our mutual objectives. Believe dialogue has helped contain a situation which otherwise could be far more disadvantageous for US and Israeli interests. National defense concerns and psychological effect of new weapons just as important in Cairo as in Jerusalem. Our ability to move significantly in this field can only be within context permitting dialogue continue with both sides. Thus it plainly in Israel’s interest as well as ours that we develop maximum influence with UAR.

Through continued quiet discussion we hope without going into any actual details to make clear to American Zionist leaders that significant progress towards arms restraint and other objectives in Near East is most difficult with Israel’s supporters mounting wide-ranging campaign stop all aid to UAR or otherwise discredit our entire Near East policy.³ So long as we continue give aid to UAR, Nasser has some vested interest in reasonable behavior. Once that aid ceased, net effect would not be to make him more reasonable but to reduce inhibitions on him. Needless to say, would also make him far more dependent on USSR.

We also hope impress on thoughtful Israeli observers relationship of our aid to our being able continue frank discussions with Nasser even on most sensitive issues. Were dialogue to break down with growing Arab uncertainty over Israel’s capabilities or our intentions, Nasser might well choose take more dangerous course of action and tie more closely with Soviet or Chicoms. At this very moment, we believe there important review UAR economic policies and hard decisions having be made how allocate existing resources. If Nasser convinced Israel going down dangerous road of sophisticated weapons or feels he being put under intolerable Western pressure likely decide give priority to military weaponry. End FYI.

At this stage we consider it essential not to permit either UAR or Israel to develop position of monitoring or controlling this extremely fragile US initiative. We want to be frank with both sides and intend keep both properly informed. We do not want either at this stage to start trying to mastermind our explorations. You should discreetly make foregoing principle clear by saying we cannot provide further substantive details on UAR talks to PM at this time. Nothing we are doing commits either side. At proper time we will provide fuller details.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCloy. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and Komer; and approved by Talbot.
2. In telegram 401 from Tel Aviv, October 14, Barbour stated that he would inform Eshkol at first opportunity of McCloy’s meeting with Nasser, as instructed in telegram 283 to Tel Aviv, October 12. He also commented on the “fragility” of U.S. progress with Nasser and noted that Eshkol had recently expressed the hope that reports of an economic crisis in the UAR would not lead to an increase of U.S. financial aid to Egypt. (Both ibid.) Telegram 438 from Tel Aviv, October 21, reported that Barbour conveyed the information to Eshkol about McCloy’s visit to Nasser. (Ibid.)
3. An October 9 memorandum from Talbot to Harriman reported indications of a concerted campaign by Israel’s supporters in the United States against U.S. efforts to maintain positive U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid., POL ARAB–ISR)