Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, November 8, 1968, 1523Z.

2647. Subj: Cyprus: Impact of Georkadjis affair.²

Summary: Very tentatively, we evaluate fallout of Georkadjis affair in three areas. In Athens-Nicosia relations, Athens has emotionally demanded and won Georkadjis dismissal but without much heed as to consequences, not least of which is arousal of nationalist feelings on island in irritated reaction to mainland pressure. In local politics, affair has set kettle bubbling with strong pressures for new elections to House of Representatives which Archbishop, urged on by Athens, is resisting. As regards local talks, all right-minded elements are seeking isolate from fallout, but as result Athens-Nicosia tensions and domestic political repercussions, delays seem inevitable.

1. It is, of course, too early to predict with complete accuracy many internal and external ramifications of Georkadjis affair. Our preliminary analysis, however, indicates general lines of impact of Georkadjis problem in three aspects of political situation on island.

2. Athens-Nicosia relations—relations between GOC and GOG appear to have been affected on various levels. First, in terms of official government-to-government relations colonels’ hand seems to be strengthened by obvious demonstration they can force Makarios to take action he supposedly reluctant to take. (Degree to which Makarios “reluctant” to fire Georkadjis is moot since His Beatitude may well have been looking for opportunity to dump increasingly powerful Interior Minister.) In any case, Makarios outwardly seems to have knuckled under to GOG demands for Georkadjis’ scalp and this has disappointed many Greek Cypriots. Second, by forcing Makarios to accept Georkadjis’ resignation GOG has further angered those politically powerful Greek Cypriot elements (i.e., city lawyer-politicians) who resent GOG meddling in GOC affairs, who are not pro-enosis and who are in favor of accommodation with Turk Cypriots (Clerides and Demetriades to name two), although they at least equally angry with Archbishop. On third level, however, Greek-Cypriot relations hardly disturbed at all. Great mass of villagers (as proved to Ambassador Alexandrakis’ satisfaction during recent village visit) still regard “Mother Greece” as “Motherly Fatherland,” welcome and support GOG presence on Cyprus, and regard Makarios as “Ethnarch” or leader of Greek nation in Cyprus.

3. Entire purpose of GOG in exposing Georkadjis and pressuring for his resignation may well have been to demonstrate to Archbishop (November 6 press carries stories stating that Archbishop ordered issuance of passport to Panagoulis) that there is point beyond which Junta will not tolerate His Beatitude’s flirtation with left. According to some reports GOG will demand and get closer cooperation of Cypriot intelligence services (other reports including word from Clerides indicate Archbishop will pull intelligence function out of Interior Ministry and place it under his own direct control as part of apparatus of Presidential Palace).

4. GOG seems be proceeding from one precipitate action to next in Georkadjis/Panagoulis affair without thinking through implications. Initial demand for Georkadjis’ resignation was achieved but only because Archbishop promised Georkadjis parliamentary elections before January as price for his final agreement to resign. Now faced with prospect of triumphant election of former MinInt to House, which would be real slap in face for GOG, they now exerting great pressure on Makarios to go back on promise to Georkadjis and according CAS info he has agreed to do so. We wonder if they have considered what implications this might have: i.e. mischief-making, not excluding violence from Georkadjis and supporters; more embarrassing leaks to press; and angry reaction from House members and others who now savouring election prospect. At moment Greek Ambassador thinks he has Archbishop’s agreement to postponement of elections, but this may well be so only until His Beatitude next talks with Georkadjis, Clerides and other House leaders.

5. Domestic political situation—As mentioned above part of deal for Georkadjis’ final resignation was undertaking by Makarios to hold parliamentary elections by end of January. Clerides informed various former EOKA-fighter groups who were demonstrating for Georkadjis of Archbishop’s agreement to hold elections. It now appears that Georkadjis who has long called for formation of anti-Communist political party will organize his own party based on fighter groups with help and support (privately if not openly) of Clerides. Other members of House who support Clerides (floor leader Demetriades and Chamber of Commerce President Savvides) likewise favor early elections and probably would join Georkadjis-Clerides coalition. Believe Clerides would remain in background in order avoid any open clash with Makarios. He told Ambassador (memcon pouched)³ he considered role as negotiator in communal talks paramount and overruling any personal feelings re election. He would need all his influence with Archbishop for such time as talks require serious compromises. He would not jeopardize his chances of making contribution to solution merely to satisfy his own strong belief that elections necessary and party organization required.

6. We expect that Archbishop is reluctant to hold elections and prefers to stall. Among other things postponement of elections would probably cause erosion of Georkadjis’ strength. Strong demand from Greek Embassy that Makarios prevent elections which would certainly install Georkadjis in House supports Makarios in own predilection to avoid or stall elections. Trouble is that Clerides and Georkadjis and fighter groups believe they have commitment for holding of these elections. Clerides, Georkadjis and his friends, and many Deputies who support Clerides will probably maintain pressure on Archbishop to hold elections. Clerides and Demetriades have even spoken to us of possibility of mass resignation of present members of House which would presumably force elections. (We doubt they would go to such extremes; no one voluntarily resigns in Cyprus.) In any case, tug-of-war between political leaders who would like to form parties and contest House elections and Archbishop who prefers House made up of political personalities without political party and dependent on him can be expected. If holding of elections becomes inevitable we anticipate His Beatitude will attempt to balance off various political factions (organized as parties) by urging all parties to unite in support of him and to agree on allocation of seats before elections. In short, net result of Georkadjis affair in domestic political arena will probably be to make political life much more “political.”

7. Local talks—As we have previously reported both GOC and Turk Cypriots have gone out of their way to immunize Georkadjis affair from adverse impact on local talks (Nicosia 2638).⁴ However, holding of elections is bound to complicate local talks even if there is prior Clerides-Denktash agreement. In first place, Greeks will only get Turk Cypriot agreement to holding of elections under 1960 Constitution which compromises Greek position on 1965 electoral law. In second place, Turks will hold their own elections (they would like to clean house as well) but question then arises will new Turk legislators start passing legislation for Turk Cypriot areas. Finally, any election campaign on Greek side risks resurrection of old nationalist war cry of “enosis and only enosis.”

8. Georkadjis affair further complicates local talks because internal GOC crisis prevents Clerides from obtaining any clear guidance from Archbishop and Council of Ministers. Given fight shaping up over elections and possibility of new Council of Ministers if elections are held, further postponement of real progress in local talks seems likely. More and more concept of “third phase” of local talks (which would begin in January or later) appearing in press and conversation. As previously reported “third phase” seems to be quite acceptable to GOT Embassy here.

9. Needless to say, typically Byzantine political maneuvering in wake of Georkadjis affair is rife and some surprises may yet be in store—particularly since Panagoulis trial is not yet ended. Our regret is that villain of the piece, Archbishop’s pro-Communist advisor, Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, at whose behest GOC apparently became involved with Panagoulis in first place, so far emerging unscathed.

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara also for Ambassador McGhee, Athens, London, USUN, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO.
2. On August 13, Alexander Panaghoulis, an anti-Junta activist and army deserter, attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos. On September 7, the Greek Government charged that the attempt had been engineered by Cypriot Minister of Defense and the Interior Polykarpos Georghiades in collaboration with Andreas Papandreou. Georghiades resigned on November 1, claiming innocence. Panaghoulis’ trial ended on November 17 with a death sentence, but he was subsequently granted clemency on December 23.
3. In airgram A–371, November 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CYP)
4. Dated November 7. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)