Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, December 3, 1967, 1517Z.

875. Vanto 86. Subject: Vance meeting with Archbishop Makarios—December 3.

1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Belcher and John Walsh, had a two-hour meeting beginning 1300 with Archbishop Makarios, President of Parliament Clerides, and FonMin Kyprianou. Makarios was adamant, rejecting para 4 as revised during the night, and refusing any further efforts at compromise. He said Greece and Turkey can do what they want but it was impossible for him to accept anything that resembled commitment prior to discussion in Security Council. He said during course of our meeting Greek Government had urged him not to reject the draft para 4 but he had refused. In final statement, he expressed great appreciation to President Johnson, Vance, and USG for untiring effort to safeguard the peace. You have done the utmost, he said, and we will always be grateful no matter what the future may bring. When Vance pressed him to ponder again and to withhold a final decision, he responded negatively. He did, however, agree to refrain from press comment, although GOC had already begun to circulate background statement that it would never knuckle under Turk pressure. Thus there was no give in the rigid GOC position as time ran out in Nicosia for the Vance Mission. Vance will leave approximately 1800 for Athens.

2. Vance opened the discussion by reading the following prepared statement:

“We have been working throughout the night and this morning in a desperate attempt to get acceptance of the proposal which we transmitted on your behalf yesterday to the Government of Turkey.

In the early morning hours the Government of Turkey flatly rejected your proposal.

Through the rest of the night our Ambassadors in Ankara and New York with almost superhuman effort endeavored to get the Turks to change their position. They have been successful in getting the Turks to agree to the fundamental issues contained in your proposal, namely, that the matter should be considered by the Security Council and that the Secretary General’s good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties. In doing this the United States has made great sacrifices. In June 1964 the United States at great political cost sent a letter from our President to the Government of Turkey in order to preserve the peace at that time. Last night in obtaining the concessions that I have referred to from the Turks, the United States again expended an important element of its influence and prestige.

The situation as we see it is as follows:

A. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey have publicly announced that Greece and Turkey have reached an agreement.²

B. Therefore, insofar as the world is concerned an agreement for peace has been reached subject only to the possibility that it may be frustrated by the unwillingness of the Government of Cyprus to permit that agreement to be implemented. This all hangs on paragraph 4.

C. With respect to paragraph 4, the Government of Turkey has said that it will return to the original language of paragraph 4 as contained in the document attached to your letter to me, and will also agree to the addition of the last sentence with respect to the good offices of the Secretary General.

D. Thus we are faced with a situation where the decision for war or peace hangs on the difference between the words ‘should be’ and ‘will discuss in the Security Council’.

You and your government are thus faced with the opportunity to go down in history as the man and the government which made the decision which preserved the peace in this area, or the decision which plunged it into war.”

3. At the end of this statement, Vance handed to the Archbishop the following revised text of para 4 negotiated during the late night hours in Ankara:

“In response to the appeal of the Secretary General there should be an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP giving it an increased pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General’s good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties.”

4. He pointed out that last night the GOT had flatly refused to accept the text of para 4 proposed by the GOC. Under our heavy and politically costly pressure, the GOT had agreed to revised para 4, cited above, which would meet GOC desires to debate issue in Security Council and to act under good offices of SYG. Turks had accepted this despite their fears that GOC would have enormous advantage in SC. We firmly believe this would protect GOC interests and would lift the terrible threat of war from the region.

5. This statement ran into a stonewall of Cypriot opposition. The Archbishop said he could not accept it because it would only create misunderstandings in the future. Greece and Turkey could do whatever they wished but he would not agree to do more than discuss the issues encompassed in para 4.

6. Kyprianou stated the Turks wished the GOC to accept certain principles and then to discuss them. Why, he asked, should the GOC make concessions. Furthermore, if the GOC agreed to the formulation as presented it would limit its freedom in the Security Council. This was a matter of substance and not merely protocol.

7. Vance then restated the familiar line of argumentation for GOC acceptance: The agreement between Greece and Turkey was a three-legged stool which would fall without GOC cooperation; the differences between the GOC and GOT drafts were largely semantical in nature; the position of the GOC in the SC would be fully protected and the GOC would have an enormous advantage in any SC debates on this issue; and finally, the world would never understand if this opportunity to prevent war were not seized.

8. This was not persuasive to the Cypriots. When Clerides, who had played a helpful role throughout the discussions, said that the world should not be surprised if the GOC does not agree, we decided to take a walk in the rose garden in search of inspiration and to buy time for Ambassador Goldberg’s efforts in New York. As we stepped into the garden, the Archbishop sweetly advised us not to work very hard since he had already made up his mind.

9. After 45 minutes, Vance resumed his advocacy of peace, reworking the argumentation and hammering at the point that the GOC was refusing the safe path to the SC and away from war simply over a matter of words which were of little consequence.

10. He went on to say that the Turks and the Cypriots were locked into rigid positions over words, and, tragically, they were going to go to war. He emphasized that, while not defending or condoning Turkish war hysteria, the GOC had to recognize that the present situation developed from the tragic incidents of November 14–15. A price must be paid by the GOC for those events. He beseeched the Archbishop to show the flexibility now required to prevent the misery of war and the loss of countless innocent lives.

11. Kyprianou then said the GOC could not accept. Their only recourse now was to go promptly to the Security Council to show the world who the aggressor was.

12. At that point, there was little more to say. Vance expressed great personal sadness about the evident failure of the search for peace in which so many people have engaged. President Johnson and he had been convinced that a just settlement was imminent and now it appeared that no one in the world would understand or appreciate.

13. He then asked with great solemnity that the Archbishop not give him a final negative answer but rather to ponder once again. Our plane would depart for Athens in a few hours and Vance could be reached there.

14. Makarios then said he had no need to ponder. He had made up his mind. Vance’s words had raised a delicate issue for him, since he was deeply grateful to President Johnson, to Vance, and to the USG who had done their utmost to preserve the peace.

Whatever the outcome of the present situation he would never forget what the United States has done. He then concluded with the words: “I know my answer”.

15. In departing the Palace, Vance, by agreement, limited his comments to the assertion that he was returning to Athens.³

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to USUN, Ankara, Athens, London, the Mission to NATO, and CINCEUR.
2. Greece and Turkey each stated on December 2 that they had reached an agreement on a settlement to the Cyprus crisis; see The New York Times, December 3, 1967.

3. In Vanto 85, December 3, Vance requested that the Secretary-General be asked to immediately release his appeal. (Ibid.) For text of this appeal (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.6), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 369–370. The decision to request the release of the Secretary-General’s appeal was made after a telephone conference among Rusk, Vance, and Goldberg. A transcript of their discussion is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 4.

   On December 3, the Greek Government, in a brief note, accepted the Secretary-General’s appeal. The Turkish Government also accepted on the same day. (U.N. Doc. S/8258/Add.7)