Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

314. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, November 22, 1967, 2030Z.

717. Ref: Nicosia 716.²

1. During 45 minute meeting with Makarios UK and Canadian HICOMers and myself, Canadian was spokesman and read prepared text including Turkish five points³ (being sent reftel).

2. Makarios commented that first three Turkish points were acceptable to him if accepted by GOG. Speaking to me he remarked that as he had said earlier today (Nicosia 710)⁴ he was in favor of complete demilitarization including removal of Greek and Turk contingents. He went on to say that presence of any foreign military troops would be source of constant friction and suspicion and therefore would be best include them in withdrawal as well. UK HICOMer remarked that for time being perhaps Turks would feel their contingent’s presence required in order give some sense of additional security to Turkish community. I remarked that this aspect of course could be included as one of items to be discussed further as suggested in last paragraph of document which Canadian HICOMer had given him.

3. After first saying that if five points acceptable to GOG he could accept also, Archbishop expressed reservations with regard (D) and (E) which he felt were matters purely concerning the GOC. He would require time to discuss these two points with his Ministers. He said he would call in Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis for further discussion of five points. I reminded him that these five points and numerous other aspects of problem had been discussed at great length in Ankara by our three colleagues and GOT representatives. These had emerged as basic points in Turkish position. They had been presented today noon by our three colleagues in Athens to FonMin Pipinelis who had said he would refer them at once to Greek Cabinet. I doubted whether Alexandrakis would have word as yet although at some point hopefully very soon, there would be some consultation, at least on last two points. I said that we would be informing Athens at once of his favorable views on reduction of forces covered in points (2) and (3) and I felt sure this would be major factor to be taken into consideration by Greek Cabinet in reaching its decision. Speed was of the utmost importance at this most critical time and he could be assured we would send this word by the fastest possible means.

4. Makarios closed meeting by commenting that ref in last para of document to “other interested parties” meant primarily Cyprus. Said that presumably discussions between Greece and Turkey could not go further into ultimate solution without involvement of GOC at early date.

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 0100Z on November 23. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Ottawa, USUN, the Mission to NATO, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2. Telegram 716, November 22, transmitted the text of the paper read to Makarios. (Ibid.)
3. Presented to the Greek Government on November 22, the five points were: 1)Turkish reaffirmation of the inviolability and integrity of the Cyprus Republic, 2)withdrawal of Greek armed forces on Cyprus in excess of the numbers permitted by the London-Zurich Agreements, 3)expansion of UNFICYP’s role to pacify the island, 4)payment of indemnities to Turkish Cypriots, and 5)security arrangements for Turkish Cypriots not dependent on Greek Cypriot police or military formation. (Telegram 2303 from Athens, November 22; ibid.)
4. Document 313.