Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, October 22, 1966, 1127Z.

2061. Cyprus.

1. During course of long private conversation Oct 21 FonMin Caglayangil brought up his last private talk with Secretary Rusk in Washington,² during which he stated he had told Secretary that while GOT had little confidence in results, it was continuing its secret bilateral conversations with Greece on Cyprus. Since that talk there had been no real closing of gap in basic views. Toumbas, despite his good will and very correct and sincere attitude, was shying away from the bases [garble] durable and final solution. Politics of Greece restricted him and he appeared intent on gaining time in view of Greece’s internal concerns. Greeks in general were insisting on enosis which could not be accepted by Turkish opposition, which was “cruel” and would say that if enosis was to be solution it could have yielded that concession to Greece itself, when in power. “Form of enosis was not Turkish affair” Caglayangil said and apparently Greeks had to have some form of enosis. As matter of fact, bilateral Greek-Turk talks had not yet included any discussion of enosis or political ties of Cyprus. Each side had at once identified “unacceptable” proposals and by mutual consent these had been set aside and dialogue focused on such matters as demilitarization of island, rights of Turk Cypriots and a base to guard Turkish community. GOT had recently insisted that Greece set forth its definite opinion on one vital element: a statute for Turkish forces on the island. If Greece could clarify its position on this matter dialogue could be continued, but GOT had no hope that this could be done. If dialogue should produce no results (and in a short time Turkey would know) this would constitute a rupture.

2. Recalling breakfast meeting with Secretary Rusk at Ankara in April,³ Caglayangil referred to Turkish aide-mémoire in which it made clear (and in accompanying conversation) that some “normalization” and “equalization” of Turk-Cypriot position on island must be undertaken. Disparity in rights between the two communities was totally objectionable and unfair. While Greeks were free to come and go everywhere on island, Turks were subjected to harassments, restrictions, assaults, and blockades. It was not humane. Secretary Rusk had agreed with Caglayangil in private portion of Washington meeting that there must be some normalization and avoidance of restriction on human rights. Now winter was approaching and situation could not be allowed to go on. If GOT were in position to tell Turk Cypriots that everything would be settled in six months and they should therefore be patient, that would be one thing. But Turkey could not give such assurance. If it should come to point where GOT had to demand from Makarios removal of restrictions imposed on Turk Cypriot community then GOT could be obliged to act to ensure compliance.

3. In response to my request for clarification status of dialogue, Caglayangil confirmed dialogue not ruptured but continuing as of now. If Greek reply to Turkish request regarding a base for Turkish troop presence on Cyprus “approached” Turkish point of view there would be possibility of further contact, for example, between Caglayangil and Toumbas. If not, there was no utility in prolonging dialogue.

4. There ensued long discussion, during which I emphasized first and foremost importance of continuing this dialogue and not having rupture. I said we estimate that present GOG while fragile was best govt in Greece foreseeable at present in its attitude toward Cyprus problem. I asked whether he had given thought to possibility of keeping talks in some status of continuation despite lack of progress and perhaps in establishing something like “hot line” to be used with Athens if events on Cyprus became serious. Caglayangil responded that he had, but there must be condition that there be some improvement in Cyprus situation. He agreed it would be most undesirable to “declare” that there had been rupture of the talks. It might even trigger fall of present Greek Govt. However, there continued in Cyprus harassments, inability of Turk Cypriots to cultivate their lands, to circulate freely, and he stressed time and again need for assurance that Turkish aid to Turk Cypriots could get through to people. Toumbas had agreed with him on this. GOT “had no desire to arm Turk Cypriots”. Arms had been too long held by both sides and shootings were chronic and irresponsible on both sides. What he objected to most was inequality of treatment. I said it had been my impression, and I felt I had received every important communication sent to Washington by our Embassy in Nicosia, that situation, while far from “normal” was nevertheless distinctly better than it had been few months ago.

There had been recent postal agreement. He nodded. Little by little and very painfully I thought some of elements in situation were being diminished. I asked whether in view of this situation on island could justify breaking off dialogue. Caglayangil seemed to agree, but then backed away to say situation not basically improved. He referred to sudden blockadings of Turk Cypriots under blanket accusation they were responsible for forest fires or explosions. He said GOT had issued most categoric instructions to Turk Cypriots not to fall into provocations. As regards explosions and shootings, he knew they occurred sporadically and were started by both sides. “For all I know”, he said, “Turks may be to blame for an explosion but Greeks should not without awaiting investigation and under general influence of prejudice declare publicly Turk Cypriots to blame and then blockade some Turk Cypriot community. This is inhuman.”

5. Caglayangil volunteered GOT not trying to rush final solution. GOT understood that “right now” Greece could not talk about partition and “right now” Turkey could not talk about enosis. As far as Turkey was concerned conversations could go on for another year or two years, or a modus vivendi worked out if situation on island could be made to improve, but this situation had had profound repercussions on Turkish public opinion. I then asked whether I could define his position as this: “If there could be some real sign in improvement in situation on Cyprus this would help him in justifying prolongation of dialogue.” He agreed.

6. I then said that he had referred to free access of Turks to their lands. One very important point which concerned me was whether Turk Cypriot leadership would permit Turk Cypriots to circulate freely to and from enclaves if Greek Cypriots permitted it. I had been disturbed over stories that Turk Cypriot judges had been actively dissuaded by local Turk authorities from resuming their positions on bench. Caglayangil made clear it was Turk Cypriot community not Turkish Government that dissuaded them and that judges did not wish to return. I said it very important to know whether, if Greek Cypriots dropped restrictions on movement of Turks, e.g. to return to their own lands (to which I understand they had been invited by GOC anyway), they would be permitted to do so and not prevented. Caglayangil replied that he could give me fullest assurance on this point. I said I proposed to relay this to Washington and he said, “Please do.”

7. When I asked Caglayangil specifically what he was suggesting we do, he again referred to private conversation with Secretary and said he had been “greatly encouraged” that Secretary had agreed with him that improvement of Turk Cypriot situation must somehow be found. GOT needed assurance that Turk Cypriots would have access to port facilities, that they could build some decent housing, that Turk relief could get through. He was very concerned that if he had no alternative but to demand from Makarios lifting of restrictions confrontation would take place from which Turkey [garble] not possibly back down. There was “question of prestige of a country of 31 million against this small island.”

8. As we had carried on this conversation for well over an hour out of total conversation of two and one-half hours, I said I would like to mull all this over and come back to see him soon.

9. Comment:

“Procedural agreement” does not appear sufficient in itself to stop GOT-Makarios confrontation if GOG-GOT dialogue lapses, even if not declared ruptured. Caglayangil obviously in dilemma over his posture on Cyprus problem on eve opening of Parliament and expected opposition probes and heckling. I think it clear he wants to declare dialogue still on. He needs badly evidences of clear improvement Turk-Cypriot situation and hopes Washington can back Athens in pressuring Govt of Cyprus.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London.
2. See footnote 3, Document 237.
3. See Document 230.