Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 11, 1966, 3:36 p.m.

713. At my request, I called on George Papandreou on August 5 for his views on current political situation. He was obviously braced to make more specific comments than on some earlier occasions.

1. Papandreou described Greece today as at critical stage. He said there are two roads it can follow. Present course would lead to catastrophe—other to normality. Queen Frederika, former ERE PriMin Pipinelis and former DefMin Garoufalias are urging King on first course. Queen Frederika is exploiting King’s sense of honor (filotima) to hold him to present catastrophic course. Present course if pursued will bring dictatorship and revolution, which would be Communist-led but supported by many non-Communists, as occurred during EAM period and guerrilla war of 1946–49.

2. Papandreou said both he and King had taken opposing positions in past and both should now forget past and look to future. Neither can renounce all past stands. In his July 23 speech, he had spoken sternly about past, but in conciliatory tone about future. King could break current impasse by making gesture of reconciliation with people in form of declaration calling for elections and confirming his desire to see smooth operation of democratic government in Greece, free and honest elections, and constitution observed. He, Papandreou, would support this.

3. Papandreou said basic issue for Constantine was and is control of army. Army should be national, not belong to any party. Former DefMin Garoufalias had made a mistake by identifying himself with the Palace because he wanted to become PriMin. Papandreou could assure King that, if there were elections and he came to power, he would appoint as DefMin someone in whom both had confidence. Neither he nor Constantine wants to see organizations in army of IDEA and Aspida type. However, King wants an army loyal to him personally.

4. Papandreou commented that people speak of splinters in the Center Party. This is not true. He alone controls party. Center policy is his policy. But if he should “leave,” he cannot guarantee that this will be the case.

5. Papandreou then made his main pitch. What is needed at present critical moment is help by Americans. US could use influence to help King see need for abandoning road leading to dictatorship. Action on American side would not be considered intervention. Dictatorship could cause chaotic situation which could have serious repercussions outside Greece (unrest in Balkans; free hand to Turkey to intervene in Cyprus). Successful functioning of democracies is in US interest all over world. It is logical for US to speak on this point to save Greece from civil war.

6. In response to my question, Papandreou said he has had no contact with Palace. Someone needs to convey his views to the King, someone outside invidious Psychiko circle (meaning Queen Mother and her confidantes). If he (Papandreou) attempted to convey this kind of feeling, it would be interpreted as compromising his position, and both sides would suffer. Gesture to be effective must be spontaneous initiative on part of King. It must not appear that there are secret agreements. Papandreou added he had not heretofore intimated these thoughts to anyone, not even to his friends.

7. I remarked that some feel rapprochement between himself and King is being impeded by public statements of younger CU elements. Papandreou acknowledged there are some “eager for applause who have found that anti-monarchist statements bring this applause. Today they say these things for demagogic reasons; if allowed to continue, they only become persuaded.” Longer present course continues bitterer are public emotions, even though demonstrations may become fewer.

8. I asked whether he expects monarchy to be electoral issue. Papandreou replied that election declaration by King could bury the issue. Campaign would then be fought mainly “between parties” of which there are really only two: ERE and Center. Except for EDA, foreign policy would not be an issue. Papandreou added that his own position is well known, i.e. Greece belongs to Western Alliance but should cultivate economic and cultural relations with East.

9. Papandreou denied that EDA has succeeded in confusing issue whether popular front exists between CU and EDA. His position of not cooperating with EDA is well known and he holds to it. Questioned about kind of electoral law he favored, Papandreou said it makes no difference whether simple or reinforced proportional system used. He wanted only return to normality. Regarding a person who could head an interim government, he quipped Greece already has an interim government with Stephanopoulos. Who heads a government, whether Kanellopoulos or Zolotas, is not significant. Important point is need for statement regarding free and honest elections.

Comment:

1. If he means it, Papandreou’s suggestion that King could have voice in selection of DefMin in any future Papandreou government represents shift from his earlier position. It was ostensibly on this issue that Papandreou broke with King in July 1965. That he should now propose a “mutually acceptable” DefMin suggests he currently sees himself caught in dilemma between aggressive harshness of positions taken by his son Andreas and continuing opposition to elections by Palace and other elements who fear what Andreas would do to Greece. There are some qualified observers who believe that in recent weeks George Papandreou has indeed (as he stated to me) become seriously concerned for the political future of Greece and who assert that his remarks on July 23 and his approving comments on the August 6 Mavros open letter to the King (see Weeka #32 August 13)² must be interpreted as a deliberate effort to separate himself from more violent statements of Andreas.

2. Papandreou looked alert and seemingly now in good health. Nonetheless, several times he showed his awareness time remaining for his active political leadership may be short. Though he repeatedly asserted he now controls all elements of party, I inferred that he realizes this is no longer true, particularly with regard to his son Andreas. This could account for his expressed desire to re-establish communications (on his own terms) with King while he is still in charge.

3. Papandreou has various means, other than the American Embassy, by which he can communicate his views to King. He may well see certain tactical advantage in trying to involve us in kind of middle-position between Kastri and Palace. He also is undoubtedly aware that, during course two conversations with Andreas in recent weeks,³ DCM urged Andreas (with obvious lack of success) to soften his attack on Palace in order help create conditions which would advance possibilities for inevitable elections. My conversation with George Papandreou might have been regarded by him as opportunity to get American influence actively in support of early elections.

4. At appropriate early occasion I propose to inform Palace of Papandreou proposal, but without comment.⁴ Palace, like Embassy, will not fail to have most serious reservations because of discrepancy between George Papandreou’s comments to me and statements of Andreas Papandreou whose speeches over weekend were even more acerbic and aggressive toward King and more inflammatory in revolutionary tone. Nevertheless, I would hope Palace would find in Papandreou’s remarks to me encouragement to establish dialogue directly with Papandreou through its own channels.

5. However, over and above the question of George Papandreou’s sincerity and his willingness and ability to disengage himself from Andreas’ policies, the Palace is faced with a more fundamental dilemma. This dilemma is whether Greek national interests and the particular interests of Palace would be better served a) by indefinitely postponing elections, notwithstanding increasingly vicious attacks of Andreas and risk of aggravation of question of the regime, in the hope that George Papandreou will disappear as an active political force and that CU will then fragment or b) by accelerating elections before position of Andreas in CU can be further consolidated and while the moderate elements in CU, presumably including George Papandreou, still have an important position. Ironically, increasing violence of Andreas may in fact precipitate elections before Andreas will have been able to achieve effective control of the CU.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, POL 15. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Talbot, Bracken, Day, and Anschuetz.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 2–1 GREECE)
3. No record of these conversations has been found.
4. Talbot informed the Palace of Papandreou’s views in a meeting with Ambassador Bitsios, Chief of the Royal Protocol Office, on August 18. He reported his talk with Bitsios in telegram 868 from Athens, August 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE)